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Securing Russia's Future: A Plea for Reform in Russian
Secured Transactions Law
Jason J. Kilborn
INrn.ODUCTION
After many turbulent years of uneasy transition to a market econ
omy, Russia is finally "open for business."' Nonetheless, the transi
tional period remains far from over, and Russian enterprises are still
starved for capital that they desperately need for retooling to convert
from military to consumer production, for acquiring new equipment to
replace old and worn machinery, and for undertaking new and lucrative
projects. While Russian financial institutions may provide significant
funding, their reserves are limited; they could not hope to finance inde
pendently the multitude of existing and potential enterprises within the
expansive Russian territory. Therefore, much of the financing for the
continuing development of Russian business has and will come from
Western sources.2
The Russian legislature recently has taken a great stride toward
further enticing Western investment by adopting a new and greatly en
hanced Civil Code. There, nested within a fairly detailed section on the
law of obligations,3 lies a subsection on various methods of securing the
performance of obligations, including an expanded and sophisticated
section on "pledge. "4

1. See Edward H. Lieberman et al., New Russian Civil Code Bodes Well for Busi
ness, NATL. LJ., Nov. 14, 1994, at ClO, C l l.
2. The Russian Federation has exhibited its serious desire to attract foreign invest
ment in many ways, including, since December 17, 1995, retaining Merrill Lynch at sig
nificant expense to act as an intermediary to attract investment from foreign markets.

See Rustam Narzikulov, Merrill Lynch Demands a Denial of Sovereignty From Russia,
SEGODNIA, May 23, 1995, at l, available in LEXIS, Bustin Library, SBE File; see also
Jeff Berliner, Russia Lures Foreign Oil Investment, UPI, Nov. 15, 1994, available in
LEXIS, News Library, UPI File.
3. The Russian Civil Code, like its European siblings, is divided into two broad
"Parts": the "General Part" and the "Special Part." The Special Part in turn is divided
into several sections, including the law of things (property) and the law of obligations,
both consensual (contracts) and those arising out of harm occasioned on others (tort).
This Note deals with part of the section governing contractual obligations and the
means for securing their performance.
4. GRAZHDANSKII KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [GK RF] arts. 334-358.
The Russian word zalog in the heading of this section of the Code has been translated
almost uniformly as pledge in scholarly commentary in English; therefore, that conven-
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For any pledge system to function effectively, enticing lenders to
part with their capital temporarily, the system must allow secured credi
tors5 to feel reasonably assured that they will be able ultimately to
regain their investments. Although secured creditors wish to avoid fore
closure and satisfaction from the collateral as much as debtors do,6 they
must have confidence that the system will provide them an acceptable
means of realizing a return if eventually they are forced to foreclose on
the collateral to avoid a loss.
While the new provisions on pledge have the potential to assure
lenders of the security of their investments, and thus to stimulate greater
flow of capital into Russian enterprises, several shortcomings might in
hibit the effective achievement of the goals underlying these provisions.
This Note focuses on one crucial birth defect of the fledgling Civil
Code: it limits the mechanisms available to secured creditors for realiz
ing on collateral following foreclosure by requiring that the collateral be

tion will apply here as well. See, e.g., William G. Frenkel, New Russian Secured Trans
actions Regime: Analysis of the Law on Pledge, SEEL, Mar. 1 993, at l, 1. [Unless oth
erwise indicated, all translations in this Note of Russian and French materials are those
of the author.] One might more accurately translate the word zalog as security interest,
see U.C.C. § 1-201(37) (1990), as it clearly encompasses much more than the narrow
historical connotation of the word pledge, which involves an obligatory transfer of col
lateral to the secured creditor (a transaction described more accurately by the Russian
word zaklad). See infra note 1 1. The reader should realize that pledge here is to be un
derstood in the broader sense of "general security interest," a connotation that the term
apparently has taken on in many civil law countries. See, e.g., GEORGES R. DELAUME,
LEGAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL LENDING AND EcONOMIC DEVELOPMENT FI
NANCING 239 (1967).
Security interests appear in a variety of contexts, but most prominently in loan
transactions involving an obligation to return borrowed funds. When a consumer
purchases a car with money borrowed from a bank or an automobile financier or when
a factory acquires a loan from a financial institution to expand its operations, the lender
desires more assurance than simply the good word of the borrower that the money will
be returned. Therefore, it takes a security interest in an item of a value equal to or
greater than the amount of the debt, for instance, in the examples listed above, the car
or the equipment or inventory of the factory. If the borrower fails to make interest pay
ments or to repay the loan according to its terms (in other words, if the borrower "de
faults"), the security interest provides a basis for the lender to go and take the item act
ing as security (to repossess or "foreclose on the collateral") and dispose of it to satisfy
the repayment obligation. See, e.g., GK RF art. 334. From the foregoing, it should be
clear that if the creditor cannot effectively enforce the security interest and dispose of
the collateral, the entire effort to secure the debt has been for naught See infra note 25.
5. A variety of terms exist for designating the parties in a secured transaction,
such as obligor-obligee, pledgor-pledgee, creditor-debtor, and so forth. For purposes of
uniformity and consistency, and in conformity with the convention in article 307 of the
Russian Civil Code, this Note refers to the party to whom the secured obligation is
owed as the "creditor" or the "secured creditor," and the party who owes the obliga
tion as the "debtor."
6. See infra section 11.B.1.
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sold at public auction.7 This limitation might seriously undermine credi
tor comfort with the personal property security system in Russia. Lack
of creditor confidence in the ability to cover the potential losses of
debtor default with the collateral securing loans likely will produce one
of two unpleasant results: either a dearth of available loan funds will
arise as creditors refuse to risk their capital, or lenders will begrudg
ingly provide loans only at exorbitant rates of interest, which will stifle
all but the boldest of potential debtors.8 In either case the progress of
Russian enterprise will be greatly slowed or halted.
This Note argues that the current Russian law governing the reali
zation of repossessed collateral is potentially harmful to both secured
creditors and debtors alike, and it therefore proposes amendments that
would benefit both parties.9 Part I briefly examines the antecedent of
the present Russian pledge law and describes the restrictions imposed
by the current law. Part II looks to the pledge regimes of several Euro
pean legal systems to explain and challenge the Russian approach. This
Part also criticizes the Russian restriction based on the development of
North American secured transactions law. Finally, Part ill proposes sev
eral possible alternatives for broadening the options available to credi
tors for satisfying the obligations owed to them following foreclosure.

7. See GK RF art. 350(1).
8. See, e.g., 2 I. ALAUZET, COMMENTAIRE DU CODE DE COMMERCE ET DE LA
LEGISLATION COMMERCIALE § 792, at 199 (2d ed. 1868) (quoting a French govern
ment official as he presented the proposed article 93 of the Commercial Code on com
mercial pledge to the French Legislative Body):
Commerce and industry need inexpensive capital; lending secured by pledge
should be one of the most economical means of procuring [capital] since it con
fers a privilege of a certain value to the lender. Otherwise, the capitalist hesitates
or demands to be paid more dearly because, in the state of legislation, he is not
assured of recovering his funds at the time indicated in the contract; his reim
bursement might be postponed by the spirit of chicanery and the delays of a trial.
Id. For a more modem expression of similar sentiments delivered by three commenta
tors, see !NTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON SECURED COMMERCIAL LENDING IN
THE COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES 22 (Jonathan Bates et al. eds.,
1994) [hereinafter CIS CONFERENCE] (Alan Farnsworth: "[P]ersonal property security
is regarded as vital to the successful operation of a market economy. In such an econ
omy a system of personal property security law is therefore just as essential as a system
of contract law." Id. at 27-28); (Lane Blumenfeld: "Without security, financial institu
tions will not lend, and without lending, business cannot flourish." Id. at 47); (Ronald
Dwight "The lack of an effective collateral law in Poland is one of the principal blocks
to the development of modem finance in Poland and a block to the development of the
entire banking system." Id. at 37).
9. It is hoped that such suggestions will be especially timely now, as Russian leg
islation undergoes a constant whirlwind of reform and development. Similarly, as other
developing countries, particularly the other former republics of the Soviet Union, begin
to draft their own secured transactions laws, they may also benefit from the analysis in
this Note.
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A BRIEF HISTORY AND THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW
This Part first touches briefly on the wholly insufficient attention

given to pledge law during the Soviet period, then it examines the
greatly improved, yet still slightly deficient, system of secured transac
tions in present-day Russia.
When it became apparent that secured lending would have to play
a prominent role in the development of a rich new Russian market
economy, Russian legislators likely built upon the base constructed by
their predecessors.10 During the Soviet period of a command economy,
elaborate provisions for securing the repayment of debts were unneces
sary because both the providers and the major consumers of credit be
longed to the state. State banks made generous loans on extremely
favorable terms to government enterprises. If an enterprise defaulted on
its loans, the government had simply transferred funds from one pocket
to another, it was of little import where the money eventually happened
to accumulate. This attitude was reflected in the skeletal provisions on
pledge in the old Soviet Civil Code, and no separate law existed to ex
pand on this miserly treatment.11 The few "hopelessly rudimentary"12

10. Although this section discusses only Soviet law, prerevolutionary Russian law
also included provisions concerning the pledge of property as security for obligations,
which were also accompanied by various limitations on the disposition of collateral.
The Sobornoe Ulozhenie of 1649 provided for obligatory and unconditional transfer of
ownership of the collateral to the creditor in case of default. Ulozhenie, ch. 10, art. 196
(1649), in 1 POLNOE SoBRANIE ZAKONOV ROSSIISKOI IMPERii art. 1 (1830). During
the next century, lawmakers first required public auction of collateral, then they abro
gated that requirement. See A.V. CHERNYKH, ZALoG NEDVIZHIMOSTI v ROSSIISKOM
PRAVE 20 (1995). Despite the legal disfavor into which public auction had fallen, how
ever, the Russian government, which had begun to act as secured creditor, continued to
include in its secured transactions a condition of obligatory public auction of collateral
in the event of default. See id.
This government stance on public auction eventually led to reform in the permitted
methods of repossession and disposition of collateral. From this reform at the turn of
the nineteenth century, and for more than a century until the Revolution, Russian pledge
law contained a default requirement of public auction, but the default rule was subject
to exception. After the debtor had defaulted on a secured obligation, the debtor or any
of her other creditors had the right to demand a public auction of the collateral. See Us
tav 0 bankrotakh, pt. 2, art. 54 (1800), in 26 POLNOE SOBRANIE ZAKONOV
ROSSIISKOI IMPERii art. 19692 (1830); 10 Svoo ZAKONOV GRAZHDANSKIKH I
MEzHEVYKH art. 1516 (1832) [hereinafter Svoo 1832]; [10 chast' 2] Svoo ZAKo.
NOV ROSSIISKOI IMPERii: ZAKONY 0 SUDOPROIZVODSTVE I VZYSKANIIAKH
GRAZHDANSKIKH art. 52 (1857) [hereinafter Svoo 1857]. But if no demand were
made for two months, or if the debtor appeared and explicitly abandoned the property in
fulfillment of the underlying obligation, the creditor could take the collateral as her own
property "irrevocably." Ustav o bankrotakh, pt. 2, art. 53 (1800); Svoo 1832 art. 1515;
Svoo 1857 art. 51.
1 1 . See GRAZHDANSKII KODEKS RSFSR [GK RSFSR] arts. 1 92-202 (1 964).
These few articles afforded overly broad and yet extremely terse treatment to the pledge
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provisions on pledge in the Soviet Civil Code grossly failed to provide
the necessary legal framework for a practicable system of secured trans
actions in a Russia that at the beginning of the 1990s entered into a pe
riod of intense political, social, and commercial transformation.
The fall of the Soviet Union in December of 1991 violently di
verted the attention of Russian lawmakers from political dogma to the
pragmatic concerns of free-market economics. Russian legislators
quickly remedied many of the inadequacies of the secured transactions
provisions of the old Soviet Civil Code by enacting two new laws gov
erning the use of personal property security. One law, the Law on
Pledge,13 is devoted entirely to the subject, and the new, more business
oriented Russian Civil Code14 contains a section on pledge among its
provisions on contractual obligations.15

law. Yet despite their significant shortcomings, the provisions on pledge in the old Code
were not totally devoid of redeeming qualities. The Soviets preserved the prerevolution
ary allowance for retention of the collateral by the debtor. This saved the Soviet system
from the complications of the ubiquitous insistence in world pledge law on transfer of
the collateral from debtor to secured party, a problem that has plagued Western coun
tries for centuries. See, e.g., ASSOCIATION EUROPEENNE o'ETUDES JURIDIQUES ET
FISCALES SECURITY ON MOVABLE PROPERTY AND RECEIVABLES IN EUROPE 3839, 58-62 (Michael G. Dickson et al. eds., 1988) [hereinafter SECURITY IN EUROPE];
GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY §§ 1.1, 2.1
(1965). While article 196 of the Soviet Civil Code of 1964 established a default rule of
transfer of collateral to the secured party, it left open the possibility of circumventing
this encumbrance by providing in the security agreement for a nonpossessory security
interest. See GK RSFSR art. 196 (1964). The drafters realized that "in the majority of
situations, transfer of the collateral to the secured party is impossible
or inexpedi
ent," and that the circumstances in which transfer of collateral would be "practically
important" were really limited to hocking an item at a pawn shop. V sESOIUZNYI
ORDENA "ZNAK PocHETA" NAuCHNo-1ssLEoovATEL'SKII INsTITUT SoVET
SKOGO ZAKONODATEL'STVA, KOMMENTARII K GRAZHDANSKOMU KODEKSU
RSFSR 242-43 (S.N. Bratus' & O.N. Sadikov eds., 3d ed. 1982).
12. See Christopher Osakwe, Modern Russian Law of Banking and Security Trans
actions: A Biopsy of Post-Soviet Russian Commercial Law, 14 WmTTIER L. R.Ev. 301,
354 (1993); see also CHERNYKH, supra note 10, at 27 ("[I]n our country pledge had
for a long time a rather ritualistic significance, accompanying the most primitive acts of
exchange." (quoting D.A. Medvedev, Rossiiskii Zakon o zaloge, PRAVOVEDENIE, No.
5, 1992, at 13)).
13. See Zakon Rossiiskoi Federatsyi "o zaloge" [Law of the Russian Federation
"on Pledge"] No. 2872-1 of May 29, 1992 [hereinafter Law on Pledge]. See supra note
4 for a discussion of the terminology used here.
14. For an excellent and authoritative discussion of the new Civil Code, see gener
ally E.A. Sukhanov, Russia's New Civil Code, 1 PARKER ScH. J.E. EUR. L. 619 (1994).
15. See GK RF arts. 334-358. The section of the new Russian Civil Code on
pledge both supplements and limits the Law on Pledge. See GK RF art. 3(2) ("Norms
of civil law contained in other laws must comply with the present Code."); lNsTITUT
ZAKONODATEL'STVA I SRAVNITEL'NOGO PRAVOVEDENIIA PRI PRAVITEL'STVE
RossnsKOI FEDERATSII, KOMMENTARII K GRAZHDANSKOMU KODEKSU Rossns
KOI FEDERATSII, CHASTI PERVOI 346 (0.N. Sadikov ed., 1995) [hereinafter KoM.
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These laws have tremendous potential to revolutionize the practice
of securing obligations in Russia by providing greater stability and pre
dictability to security in a broad range of tangible and intangible prop
erty rights.16 Debtors are now free to secure their obligations with in
ventory,17 the "separable and inseparable proceeds" of the original
collateral,18 as well as after-acquired property and property rights.19
Whole enterprises can also serve as collateral, in which case the secur
ity interest extends to the entirety of the property and property rights
belonging to that enterprise.20 Moreover, the new

law explicitly

presumes that the debtor will remain in possession of these various
forms of collateral, thus recognizing the greater convenience and effi
ciency of such "nonpossessory" security arrangements.21 The new laws
have also expanded the range of securable obligations to include those
arising after conclusion of the security agreement.22 Finally, both the
Law on Pledge and the Civil Code are replete with opportunities for the
debtor and the secured creditor to avoid the ready-made suppletive rules
in the laws and to mold their agreement in a way that suits their partic
ular preferences.23 Such expanded and clarified treatment of the inter
ests involved in secured transactions seems to pave the way toward the
implementation of modem finance techniques in Russia.24

MENTARII GK RF] ("The nonns of [the Law on Pledge] retain their force and will be
applied to the extent that they do not contradict the Civil Code.").
16. See GK RF art. 336(1); Law on Pledge arts 4(2), 54(1). The intangible prop
erty rights subject to pledge presumably include such things as accounts receivable,
business goodwill, and intellectual property rights.
17. See GK RF art. 357; Law on Pledge arts 46-48.
18. See GK RF art. 340(1); Law on Pledge art. 6(2).
19. See GK RF art. 340(6); Law on Pledge art. 6(3).
20. See GK RF art. 340(2); Law on Pledge art. 44(1).
21. See GK RF art. 338(1) ("The collateral shall remain with the debtor unless
otherwise provided for by agreement"). Compare this provision with the language of
its predecessor: "The collateral
shall be transferred to the secured party unless oth
erwise provided by law or agreement" GK RSFSR art. 196 (1964). But see supra note
11 and accompanying text Although the practical effect of these provisions is the same,
the legal presumption, and seemingly the preference, has shifted to nonpossessory
interests.
22. See Law on Pledge art. 4(3).
23. See, e.g., GK RF arts 338, 340-347, 349, 357; Law on Pledge arts 5-6, 9, 20,
23, 25, 36-38, 44, 46, 49-51, 53-54, 56-58 (all making reference to the security agree
ment as a possible central or controlling factor in the detennination of the rights and re
sponsibilities of the parties).
24. See Liebennan et al., supra note 1, at ClO; see also Osakwe, supra note 12, at
355 ("Without doubt, [the Law on Pledge] launches a new era in Russian law of mort
gages. It catapults Russian Jaw of security transactions into the family of Western law
and will certainly persuade Western investors and lenders that it is safe to lend money
in Russia."). While the advances made possible by the new law are indeed significant,
Professor Osakwe's enthusiastic optimism about their immediate effect on the attitude
.

.
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Yet the ultimate achievement of a warm financial climate may re
main farther away than anxious lenders might think. Stifling restrictions
imposed at the final stage of the secured transactions continuum have
the potential to undermine severely the effectiveness of the many lauda
ble advances described above. The entire complex process of negotiat
ing, creating, and registering a security agreement is conducted on the
premise that if the debtor defaults on her obligation, during the crucial
last throes of the transaction the secured creditor may resort to the col
lateral to mitigate, and ideally eliminate, the loss.25 At this pivotal point,
however, the Russian Civil Code confines the parties to realizing on the
collateral only through sale at public auction.26
of Western investors in Russia may be a bit hasty. This Note points out one problem
created by the new Civil Code, and there are other reasons for Western investors to re
main cautious about diving headfirst into the Russian investment arena. See, e.g., Lie
bennan et al., supra note l, at ClO ( In . .. secured transactions, existing legislation is
clearly inadequate. For example, although Russia requires registration of security inter
ests, the government has been slow to create registries. Existing legislation does not ad
equately address priorities among creditors or the rights of creditors that simply cannot
register their liens.").
25. One commentator has excellently described the central importance of reliable
default procedures:
No matter how beautifully synthesized the scholar may consider the Code's rules
on priorities, after-acquired property, dominion over the collateral, or notice fil
ing, the Code fails as a practical matter unless it effectively promotes an efficient,
fair, and prompt means for the payment of the debt by resort to the collateral.
William E. Hogan, The Secured Party and Default Proceedings Under the UCC, 47
MINN. L. REV. 205, 206-07 (1962) (footnotes omitted); see also Charles Hampton
White, Tennessee Law and the Secured Transactions Article of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 17 VAND. L. REv. 835, 867 (1964) ("All of the intricate and theoretical niceties
of article 9 depend upon and are, in fact, designed to deal with one catastrophe: the de
fault of the debtor ....").
26. See GK RF art. 350(1). In contrast, the Law on Pledge allowed the parties to
choose in the security agreement to deviate from the public auction requirement. Law
on Pledge art. 28(2) (providing that realization shall take place as directed by civil pro
cedural law "unless otherwise provided for by this Law or by the agreement "). How
ever, the Law on Pledge antedates the Civil Code by two years, and the foreclosure pro
visions of article 28 of the Law on Pledge have been substantially modified by the new
Civil Code, which controls in case of conflict. See GK RF art. 3(2); see also Posta
"

novlenie Plenuma Verkhovnogo Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii i Plenuma Vyshego Arbi
trazhnogo Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii 0 nekotorykh voprosakh, sviazannykh s
primeneniem chasti pervoi Grazhdanskogo kodeksa Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Decree of the
Plenum of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation and of the Supreme Arbitration
Court of the Russian Federation On Several Questions Connected with the Application
of Part One of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation], Ross. GAZETA, Aug. 13,
1 996, at 5, 6 [hereinafter Postanovlenie] ("Current law does not provide for the possi
bility of transferring ownership of pledged property to the secured creditor.Any agree
ment providing for such transfer is void . . . ."); supra note 15. Compare the Law on
Pledge art. 28(1) (providing for foreclosure on movable, i.e., personal, property only
through judicial decision or, in special circumstances, on the basis of an execution order
issued by a notary) with the newly liberalized foreclosure provisions of the Civil Code,
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The Code directs that the sale be conducted in accordance with
procedural legislation, which leads the ill-fated secured creditor to the
archaic Russian Civil Procedural Code.27 The Procedural Code directs
that a court officer shall conduct the auction and that the collateral be
turned over to her for sale between five days and one month after fore
closure.28 The court officer is responsible for publicizing the auction
and for notifying the secured creditor - who can bid on the collateral
- of the time and place of the auction.29
discussed immediately below.Article 350 of the Civil Code appears explicitly to reverse
the more liberal position on realization in the Law on Pledge.Given that the drafters of
article 350 have excluded from the new Code provision any deference to the wishes of
the parties, they apparently have limited the alternatives for realization of the collateral
to one option: public sale.
This conclusion is supported by a comparison of the language of the foreclosure
provisions in the Code with the provisions on the subsequent realization of foreclosed
collateral. Article 349 of the Code provides for foreclosure on both immovable (real)
and movable (personal) property "according to the decision of a court." GK RF art.
349(1)-(2). However, article 349 expressly gives the parties the freedom to agree on a
different foreclosure procedure, avoiding recourse to the court.See GK RF art.349(1)
(2). Moreover, for true pledges, when the creditor holds the collateral, the parties can
even define their own foreclosure procedure in advance in the security agreement.See
GK RF art. 349(2).
The very next article, on the other hand, then orders the parties to sell this "fore
closed" collateral at public auction, and it conspicuously lacks any exception for con
trary agreement, either before or after conclusion of the security agreement. See GK RF
art. 350. Where Russian legislators have intended to provide for deference to party
agreement, they have apparently done so in numerous places. See supra note 23. It
would seem to follow that where they have not done so, Russian lawmakers have in
tended to prohibit any deviation from the prescriptions of the Code, and given the his
torical formalism of the Russian judiciary, Russian judges will likely interpret the direc
tions in article 350 literally and exclusively.See Postanovlenie, supra.
27. See GRAZHDANSKII PROTSESSUAL'NYI KoDEKS RSFSR [GPK RSFSR].Al
though the Procedural Code addresses only the sale of residential structures at public
auction, see GPK RSFSR arts 399-405, the same provisions presumably will apply to
the sale of repossessed movable collateral by similar means.See KOMMENTARII GK
RF. supra note 15, at 359.
The Civil Procedural Code of the Russian Republic of 1964, with numerous
amendments, remains the source of Russia's procedural law today.Recognizing that the
old Procedural Code "almost completely fails to respond to the changed economic, po
litical, and social conditions of Russian society ...particularly
after the enactment
of ...part 1 of the Civil Code of the RF," the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Feder
ation has announced the completion of a new draft Civil Procedural Code. Press
sluzhba MiuRF Podgotovlen proekt GPK RF, Ross. IusT Aug.1995, at 1, 1.
28. See GPK RSFSR arts 398-399.
29. See GPK RSFSR art. 400. Those wishing to participate in the auction must de
posit with the court officer a document certifying that they are not legally prohibited
from acquiring ownership of the collateral, along with a sum equal to ten percent of the
initial bidding price of the collateral. See GPK RSFSR art. 402. The initial bidding
price is determined according to the method of foreclosure, see supra note 26: If fore
closure was accomplished through judicial process, then a judge will decide the initial
price; otherwise, the parties must agree upon an initial price. See GK RF art. 350(3).
.
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If certain procedural irregularities occur during or after the sale,
the auction is declared void, 30 and the secured creditor receives her first
chance to retain the collateral in partial satisfaction of the obligation.
Unfortunately for the debtor, the secured creditor talces the collateral
not in the sense of "strict foreclosure,"31 but rather by crediting the ini
tial bidding price to the remaining unpaid amount of the secured obliga
tion and pursuing a deficiency remedy for the remainder.32 Moreover,
the secured creditor can bide her time, refuse the collateral, and await a
repeat auction.33 If the auction is declared void a second time, the se
cured creditor can appropriate the twice-spurned collateral and credit
the debtor for an amount "no more than ten percent less than the initial
sale price of the collateral at repeat auction."34 If the secured creditor
fails to talce the collateral and credit the debtor, the security agreement
terminates. 35 If, on the other hand, the collateral produces a return at
auction in excess of the obligation, the secured creditor is obligated to
return the excess to the debtor,36 although any surplus return is, as one
prominent commentator has observed, but a "glittering mirage."37 The
"grim reality" is an inadequate return on the collateral and a deficiency
demand by the secured creditor.3 8

One can imagine the tribulation that the parties might undergo in arriving at a mutually
acceptable price, and the law seems to ignore this problem entirely. For criticism of the
problem of establishing a fair price at auction, see CHERNYKH. supra note 10, at 80.
30. In order to take her prize, the winning bidder must within five days remit the
entire amount of the winning bid, minus a credit for the initial 10% deposit, and if she
fails to present the funds within the time period, her 10% deposit forfeits to the state
and the auction is declared void. See GPK RSFSR arts. 402, 403(3). The auction pro
ceedings suffer a similar fate if fewer than two bidders appear at the auction or if none
of the bidders proposes a bid in excess of the initial price. See GPK RSFSR art. 403(1)
(2).
31. Strict foreclosure involves acceptance by the secured creditor of the collateral
in full satisfaction of the obligation. See 4 JAMES J. WlITI"E & ROBERT S. SUMMERS,
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 34-9 (4th ed. 1995). The procedure provided by the
Russian law is not such an even-up transaction.
32. See GK RF art. 350(4)-(5).
33. The court officer may announce a second auction no sooner than ten days after
the initial failed proceedings, and the repeat auction begins at the agreed initial bidding
price or "at the first price offered." See GPK RSFSR art. 404.
34. GK RF art. 350(4).
35. See GK RF art. 350(4).
36. See GK RF art. 350(6).
37. See GILMORE. supra note 11, § 43.2, at 1188.
38. See id.
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POSSIBLE RATIONALES FOR AND CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE
LIMITATION TO PlmLIC SALE

Due to the lack of readily accessible legislative history in Russia,39
one can only speculate about the motivations of the Russian legislature
in crafting the secured transactions law as it did. However, Russia joins
a number of other European countries in statutorily requiring realization
of collateral through public auction, and the reasoning of those other
countries' legislatures for imposing the restriction provides the best
source of insight into the rationale for the Russian legislators' similar
decision. This Part reveals that the European limitations have been
eroded in many ways not present in the Russian context, and it argues
that the reasoning behind the limitation is not as well founded as its
proponents originally thought. Section II.A discusses certain European
realization regimes and argues that, despite the apparent adoption of the
public auction limitation by several commercially sophisticated Western
European states, each of these systems actually allows greater flexibility
than might immediately appear. Section 11.B scrutinizes the major pol
icy consideration for restraining the creditor and argues that little or no
protection is necessary to counter creditor laxity during realization be
cause the creditor has a vested interest in maximizing resale price.
Moreover, this section demonstrates that the current language of the
Russian law expands, rather than limits, opportunities for abuse by the
creditor. Finally, section 11.C challenges the restriction based on the de
velopment of secured transactions law in North America.
A.

Western European History and Practice

Since the countries of Western Europe have engaged in free-market
commerce for a significant amount of time and have accumulated a rich
history of practice over many years, Russian lawmakers understandably
looked to several of their Western neighbors for guidance in drafting
their new Civil Code.40 Particularly given the Netherlands' recent com-

39. See E-mail from Peter Maggs, Professor, Univ. of Ill. School of Law, to author
(Mar. 20, 1 996); E-mail froni Brenda Horrigan, atty., Salans, Hertzfeld & Heilbraun,
Moscow, to author (Apr. 7, 1996); E-mail from Ilya Nikiforov, Administrator, FPLE
GAL Digest, to author (Mar. 23, 1996).
40. See, e.g., 2-A THOMAS H. REYNOLDS & ARTURO A. FLORES, FOREIGN
LAW: CURRENT SOURCES OF CODES AND BASIC LEGISLATION IN JURISDICTIONS
OF THE WORLD Russia 5-6 (1996) ("Major consulting sources for this effort were
Dutch, German and other western European scholars, who worked with Russian experts
in the drafting process."). American experts participated in the effort to a lesser extent.
See, e.g., Jonathan H. Hines, Russia's New Civil Code Further Improves Climate for
Business, SEEL, Jan. 1995, at 1, 1 .
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pletion of an intensive redrafting of the Dutch Civil Code,41 advice from
the Dutch was undoubtedly of great value to the Russian drafting pro
cess, and German scholars also provided significant consultation in the
drafting effort. Although direct French participation was limited, the
venerable Code Napoleon and the history of its adoption provide insight
into the possible motivations of the Russian drafters, particularly re
garding their decision to impose the public auction restriction.
This section examines the provisions on pledge in the civil codes
of the Netherlands, Germany, and France, focusing on the rigidity or
flexibility with which they regulate a creditor's actions in realizing on
collateral after foreclosure. After presenting the general limitation in
each code, this section points to the language of the codes and to con
temporary practice to show that the limitations of the European laws are
not as confining as they initially might appear in isolation. Therefore,
the strictures of the Russian Civil Code, while supposedly founded on
European practice, actually bind creditors' hands significantly more
than their Western European counterparts. This section also alludes to
possible application of these European approaches in the Russian con
text. Section II.A.1 examines statutory language that confmes and pro
vides exceptions to the public auction limitation. Section II.A.2 dis
cusses the dilution of the limitation by narrow interpretation of the
statutory language. Finally, section II.A.3 looks beyond the codes to
commercial practice that sidesteps the pledge law entirely and relies on
other, more permissive legal constructs for security.
1.

Other Code Provisions

The German, Dutch, and French Civil Codes all contain some pro
vision initially dictating that, following foreclosure, the creditor shall
effectuate a resale of the collateral in order to satisfy her demands by
way of public auction.42 However, while the Russian Code stops here,
the European codes continue and offer greater flexibility by retreating
from the initial, bright-line limitation.
One important exception in the European codes is an allowance for
sale by a broker when the collateral consists of property normally sold
on a recognized market. The German Civil Code, for example, provides
that if the collateral has an "exchange or a market price," the creditor
41. The new Dutch Civil Code came into effect on January 1, 1992, replacing the
Civil Code of 1838. See STEVEN R. S CHUIT ET AL., DUTCH BUSINESS LAW § 7.01 [2]
(3d ed. Supp. 1993). The revision included a wholesale redrafting of the section on the
law of property, including the law of pledge. See id.
42. See BURGERLICHES GESE'IZBUCH [BGB] arts. 1228, 1235(1) (F.R.G.);
BURGERLUK WETBOEK [BW] art. 3:250 (Neth.); CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 2078 (Fr.).
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may effect the sale through a broker.43 The Dutch inserted a similar ex
ception into their law in the case of publicly traded commodities and
securities.44 For "commercial" pledges, the French Commercial Code
also permits the sale of collateral by an agent more familiar with the
specific goods involved.45 This logical and constructive exception is cu
riously absent from the Russian Code. Professional brokers who have
experience selling such items are clearly better positioned to gamer a
suitable price for such collateral than the public officer who would oth
erwise be responsible for conducting the sale.46
Admittedly, of the Russian entities that might offer expertise in
selling specific commodities, such as the new securities exchange,
many currently lack the experience and reliability of their Western
counterparts. However, for producing the highest possible returns on
sales, they nonetheless represent a forum clearly superior to a simple
public auction conducted by a court officer. The parties should be al
lowed, indeed encouraged, to take advantage of the appropriate ready
made markets when they exist. Professional brokers can offer the
knowledge and the resources to ensure the most acceptable return on
the types of collateral with which they are used to dealing. Even the
most experienced court officer could not compete with those profession
als whose business consists entirely of maximizing the return on such
items.
A more significant exception that appears in both the German and
Dutch Civil Codes allows the parties to deviate freely from the confines
of the public sale when they feel that a modified procedure more likely
would lead to an optimal return. After default has occurred, the parties
may privately agree to seek realization of the collateral in some other
way, such as through private sale.47 Moreover, if either party feels that a
method of sale other than that prescribed by the law more equitably
protects her interests, that party may demand that the disposition take
place in that way.48 If the parties fail to agree on an alternate method of
43. See BGB arts. 1235(2), 1221 (Simon L. Goren trans., 1994).
44. See BW art. 3:250(1).
45. See CODE DE COMMERCE [C. COM.] art. 93; see also 2 ALAUZET, supra note
8, § 795, at 202; SECURITY IN EUROPE, supra note 1 1 , at 40.
46. See GPK RSFSR arts. 398-399 (discussed supra note 28 and accompanying
text); see also infra notes 143, 151-54 and accompanying text.
47. See BGB art. 1245; SCHUIT ET AL., supra note 41, § 7.02[6][a][i]. A clever
means of bypassing domestic regulation by party agreement evidently exists in the
Netherlands, where the parties may at any time agree on a sale of the collateral abroad,
"in which case the requirement of a sale by public auction does not apply." SECURITY
IN EUROPE, supra note 1 1 , at 125.
48. See BGB art. 1246; BW art. 3:251; see also S CHUIT ET AL., supra note 41,
§ 7.02[6][a][i] ("The President of the District Court may, at the request of either the
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sale, a court then decides which method to pursue.49 The Russian Code
provides no such options.
2.

Narrow Interpretation of the Limitation

Although the clear wording of the European codes may seem
strictly to limit the creditor to on1y one option for disposing of the col
lateral, in some cases European courts and commentators have made
broad inroads into these restrictions by reading exceptions into the lan
guage of the initial rules. If Russian courts apply similar interpretations
to the current Russian provisions, creditors might regain substantial
freedom. These alternate remedies are, however, by no means wholly
satisfactory, and the extensive experience and analysis leading to such
alternatives in Western Europe has not yet had time to develop in
Russia.
These inferential exceptions to the public auction requirement have
wedged their way between the cracks of the statutory building blocks
from the very beginning. At his first presentation to the Conseil d'Etat50
of the draft of what eventually would become article 2078 of the Code
Napoleon,51 Theophile Berlier52 noted that the restrictions on disposition
of collateral could be avoided entirely simply by having the debtor
transfer title to the collateral by sale to the creditor.53 Despite the con
cerns of many commentators who feared that this might give rise to
fraud, the sale could be accomplished even before the debt became due
- presumably as soon as the parties had concluded the security agree
ment.54 Moreover, since the debtor could agree to sell the collateral to

pledgee or the pledgor, order a different form of sale, such as a private sale to a specific
third party, so that higher proceeds may be realized.").
49. See BGB art. 1246(2).
50. The Conseil d'Etat in postrevolutionary France was the de facto lawmaker of
the time. See [4 Deuxieme partie] PIERRE LAROUSSE, GRAND DICTIONNAIRE
UNIVERSEL DU XJXE SIBCLE 973-74 (1982).
51. Article 2078 contains the provision that requires disposition of repossessed
collateral by public auction.
52. Berlier was the reporter for the legislative section of the Conseil d'Etat, of
which he was, accordingly, a member. See 16 LoCRE, LA LEGISLATION CIVIl..E , CoM
MERCIALE ET CRIMINELLE DE LA FRANCE 1 (1829); see also [2 Premiere partie]
LAROUSSE, supra note 50, at 589.
53. See 15 P.A. FENET, RECEUIL CoMPLET DES TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES DU
CODE CIVIL 197 (1827).
54. Certain creditors, critics suspected, could easily take advantage of the inferior
bargaining position of the debtor and pressure the debtor into an unfavorable sale, thus
appropriating the collateral at a price well below its real value. See, e.g., 18 M.
DURANTON, COURS DE DROIT FRAN<;AIS SUIVANT LE CODE CIVIl.. § 537 (1844).
Nevertheless, Duranton indicates that it was judged better to avoid establishing a
formal prohibition of such sales when abuse was "almost impossible to foresee." See
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the creditor, she could just as easily consent to a sale by the creditor to
a third party, completely unconstrained by the provisions of article
2078.55 Thus, the commentators made amply clear that article 2078
sought to avoid abusive creditor tactics only in the guise of a clause in
the security agreement granting the creditor the right ex ante to diverge
from the formalities of the law. In contrast, a postdefault agreement
achieving a functionally equivalent result was entirely acceptable to the
conseillers.
Additionally, commentators reveal various means of avoiding even
the bedrock aversion to the "pacte commissoire," which consists of a
clause in the security agreement allowing the creditor to retain the col
lateral in the event of default. The parties could, for example, insert into
their security agreement a clause authorizing the creditor to retain the
collateral without recourse to the judiciary for proper valuation, as di
rected by article 2078, but rather according to the valuation assigned to
the collateral by third parties chosen by the debtor and creditor.56 Partic
ularly daring creditors could take advantage of an arrangement bearing
an even more striking resemblance to the pacte commissoire: the parties
could agree in the security agreement that, in the event of default, the
creditor would be allowed to choose any item from the property of the
debtor as payment of the debt. Such a "conditional sale," even though
clearly "not absolutely without danger for the debtor," was viewed as
beyond the reach of the pledge law and therefore an acceptable circum
vention of its restrictions.s7
Through similar liberal interpretation of the Russian Code, Russian
judges might broaden the range of options available to secured parties.58

id. Similarly, another commentator wondered how one could, "without exaggerating
and showing oneself to be more rigorous than the law itself," annul the debtor-to·credi
tor sale in such a case. 2 PAUL PONT, EXPLICATION THEORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DU
CODE CIVIL § 1 162 (1867). While recognizing that the Code would nullify a clause in
the security agreement that authorized the creditor to appropriate the collateral upon de
fault, i.e., a pacte commissoire, Pont argues that negotiated sales are substantively
different
The loss of property is not here, as in the pacte commissoire, subordinated to a
condition: the debtor immediately perceives the consequences of the consent that
he is going to give; and if the conditions of the sale are too unfavorable to him, it
is presumed that he will resist the obsessions of the creditor.
Id.
55. See PONT, supra note 54, § 1 163.
56. See id. § 1 159.
57. See id. § 1 160; see also 7 J.M. BOILEUX, COMMENTAIRE SUR LE CODE NA
POLEoN 134-36 (6th ed. 1860).
58. The Russian Code, however, is apparently not as amenable to exceptions as is
the French Code. The language of the French provision limits only clauses in the origi
nal security agreement and allows room for later agreements to modify the parties' re-

October 1996]

Note - Russian Secured Transactions

269

After all, party agreement may now control the method of foreclosure;59
why not simply extend that liberalism to realization? Such a judicial ap
proach would strengthen the position of creditors significantly and pos
sibly give them greater confidence in the pledge law. But particularly
because the civil law system of Russia would not recognize any binding
effect of the precedent set by such judicial interpretations, direct legisla
tive revision of the law would be preferable to vague reliance on possi
ble judicial activism.
3.

Independent Evasive Techniques

Finally, various security devices and practices, divorced from the
code framework, eventually developed in Europe to fill the void created
by the overly confining code provisions on pledge.60 These formalistic
devices allow the parties to subject their transaction to a different set of
rules that better accommodates their wishes by simply calling it by an
other name. Indeed, these extrastatutory devices have largely replaced
the pledge as the choice for securing obligations.61 Each of the major al
ternate forms involves some sort of manipulation of title since if the
creditor holds legal title to the collateral, she is free to dispose of the
collateral in any way desired. This section focuses on two independent

sponsibilities. See C. crv. art. 2078 ("Any clause [in the security agreement] that would
authorize the creditor to appropriate the collateral or to dispose of it without regard to
the above formalities shall be null." (emphasis added)). The Russian provision, in con
trast, mentions neither clause nor agreement It simply directs that the collateral be real
ized through public auction. See GK RF art. 350. The historical formalism of the Rus
sian judiciary would seem to indicate that no exception will be ascribed to the clear
language of the Code. See Postanovlenie, supra note 26.
59. See GK RF art. 349(2); see also supra note 26.
60. These independent security devices emerged mainly to overcome the problem
atic requirement of obligatory transfer of possession of the collateral to the creditor. See,
e.g., SECURITY IN EUROPE , supra note 11, at 38, 58-59, 123 ("[I]n fact there is no real
choice [between pledge and other forms of security interests] since in the case of pledge
. . . the pledgor must give up possession . . . which in most cases is not a practical pro
position . . . . "). Although Russian law rectified this crucial complication long ago, see
supra note 11, the means by which European creditors acquired nonpossessory security
interests also often provided them with more liberal realization procedures as well.
Therefore, this discussion is still applicable to the Russian problem of limited realiza
tion mechanisms.
61. See, e.g., CIS CONFERENCE, supra note 8, at 56 ("[Pledge] has lost through
banking practice [using fiduciary transfer of title] almost any practical importance.");
NORBERT HORN ET AL., GERMAN PRlvATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW 185 (Tony
Weir trans., 1982) (indicating that the institution of taking security through pledge of
movable property has lost its importance in Germany as other more flexible forms of
security, such as retention of title and security title, have taken its place); S ECURITY IN
EUROPE, supra note 11, at 38 ("Generally speaking, French law has seen a certain
move away from traditional forms of security interest based on a pledge.").

270

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 95:255

security devices: retention of title, which is limited to purchases on
credit extended by the vendor, and fiduciary transfer of title, a more
flexible and widely applicable device.
Often sellers are willing to part with their wares only if they can
be assured payment, and one way that this has been accomplished is by
sellers initially retaining title to the goods after sale on credit. The seller
releases possession of the goods to the buyer but retains legal title until
the buyer transfers the full amount of the purchase price. The parties in
such common situations have created the functional equivalent of a
nonpossessory pledge: the seller-creditor makes a loan of the purchase
price to the buyer-debtor secured by the item purchased. Here, however,
the creditor is not plagued by the cramping restrictions of the pledge
law because she is, after all, the owner of the collateral and may simply
regain

the

item

from

the

debtor

upon

default

for

unhindered

disposition. 62
This method of evading the constraining pledge law still occupies
a prominent position in Germany today, as sellers commonly seek pro
tection in what they call Eigentumsvorbehalt, or reservation of title.63
Upon eventual satisfaction of the condition precedent of full payment in
the sales contract,64 title to the goods transfers to the purchaser, but the
seller remains fully protected as legal owner of the goods until then.65
An almost identical legal framework of retention of title exists in the
Netherlands,66 and a similar device protects French merchants as long as
an agreement (perhaps in the sales contract) providing for retention of
title is executed upon or before delivery of the goods to the buyer. 67
Russian sellers might be able to take advantage of an analogous
device, but this is by no means certain, and explicit provisions of the
Code may quell any such attempts. In the new section on property

62. This ancient practice enjoyed widespread use as a security device in the
United States under the name "conditional sale" for an extended period before merging
into the general category of "security interests" in the Uniform Commercial Code. See
GILMORE, supra note 1 1 , §§ 3.1-3.8.
63. See, e.g., HORN ET AL supra note 61, at 183. This manipulation of the law of
secured transactions found its origin in a section of the German Civil Code that permits
vendors to retain legal ownership of property sold until full receipt of the purchase
price. See BGB art. 455.
64. "Extremely widespread" clauses enumerating such conditions appear in "al
most all credit sales" in Germany. HORN ET AL supra note 61, at 183.
65. See Hans Stoll, Droit des Biens, in 3 INTRODUCTION AU DROIT ALLEMAND
(Rfil>UBLIQUE FEoERALE): DROIT PRivE 131, 189 (Michel Fromot & Alfred Rieg
eds., Pierre Chenut & Jean-Marc Hauptmann trans., 1991) ("[T]he seller can fully in
voke the right of ownership, which continues to belong to him.").
66. See SCHUIT ET AL., supra note 41, § 7.03.
67. See, e.g., Stephan H. Haimo, A Practical Guide to Secured Transactions in
France, 58 TuL. L. REv. 1 1 63, 1 174-75 (1984).
.,

.,
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rights, the Russian Civil Code explicitly recognizes a broad range of
discretionary rights of the owner of property to do with that property
what she will.68 Among these rights is the discretion "to transfer [to
third parties], while remaining the owner, the rights of possession, use,
and disposal of the property . . . and to encumber [the property] in other
ways. "69 This provision may act as a vehicle to allow sellers to transfer
sold goods into the possession of buyers on credit while retaining title
until the purchase price has been paid.
However, sellers ought not attempt this procedure without seri
ously considering the code provision on the invalidity of fictitious and
sham transactions.70 If any sort of dispute were to arise at the execution
stage - or at any other time - a court might either invalidate the en
tire transaction, leaving the seller completely unprotected, or divert the
parties back to the prescribed track by applying the rules on pledge "the transaction that the parties actually had in mind. "71 Nevertheless,
one of the innovations of the new Code is an implication that other
forms of security might arise,72 so it remains to be seen how Russian
courts will react to independent security devices like those that have de
veloped in Western Europe.
While retention of title represents an excellent source of security
for credit sales, its applicability is limited to sellers who initially hold
legal title to the goods. Retention of title is unavailable to other lenders
who bear only an indirect relationship to the collateral. In order to fill

68. See GK RF art. 209.
69. GK RF art. 209(2).
70. See GK RF art. 170. The new article 170 appears to be simply a slightly re
worded variant of its little-used predecessor in the RSFSR Civil Code, article 53. This
may indicate that the revised article will change nothing, and only if the hidden transac
tion is illegal will the judiciary reject the alternate structure. See KOMMENTARII GK
RF, supra note 15, at 216 ("As a rule, the transaction that the sham transaction conceals
is illegal."). On the other hand, attempting to take advantage of the buyer and create an
extrastatutory security interest may be considered manipulative enough to apply this ar
ticle. See id. (noting, as examples of hidden transactions counteracted by this article, the
conclusion of transactions by a legal entity beyond the description of its purposes listed
in its foundation documents, and the conclusion of transactions without a proper license
to engage in such activity).
71. GK RF art. 170(2).
72. See GK RF art. 329(1) (listing the methods of securing obligations, concluding
with "other methods provided for by law or agreement"). Professor Sukhanov, one of
the leaders of the drafting team, has emphasized the freedom of contract aspects of the
new Code, particularly in the section on possible alternate forms of security. See E.
Sukhanov, Novyi Graz/ulanskii Kodeks Rossii, ZAKONNOST'. Mar. 1995, at 2, 5; see
also B. Zavidov & N. Kurtsev, Zalog - odin iz sposobov obespecheniia obiazatel'stv,
Ross. IusT., Aug. 1995, at 14, 14.
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this void, Gennan and Dutch practice produced a mutation of the reten
tion of title device, called fiduciary transfer of title.73
Given its flexibility and wide applicability, fiduciary transfer of ti
tle has become the most commonly used security device in Gennany.74
The concept of Sicherungsiibereignung is achieved by simple agreement
that title to the collateral be transferred to the creditor.75 The debtor re
tains her crucial possession of the collateral, but the creditor acquires a
temporary property right in the collateral that tenninates after perfonn
ance of the obligation.76 Just as the parties agreed to vest title tempora
rily in the creditor, so they are free to agree on how the interest thus
created is to be enforced, including the particular means of realizing on
the collateral.77 Given the option, the parties nonnally choose to salvage
the value of the collateral through private sale.78 Thus, fiduciary transfer
of title from debtor to creditor allows the parties to avoid the limitations
of the pledge law and design their own system of controls.
Here again, while Russian property law appears to accommodate
such arrangements, the judiciary may simply step in and invalidate
them as sham transactions concealing a security interest.79 The coopera-

73. Because the Dutch law of fiduciary transfer of title largely resembled the Ger
man law and, more importantly, because the new Dutch Civil Code expressly invali
dates the device today, see BW art. 3:84(3), the discussion in this section will be lim
ited to Germany.
74. See SECURITY IN EUROPE, supra note 1 1 , at 58. Some of the various areas in
which the security title device has been applied include "commerce (contents of ware
houses), in industry (machinery and means of production), and even in the domestic
sphere (chattel mortgages of automobiles, television sets, etc.)." HORN ET AL supra
note 61, at 186.
75. See SECURITY IN EUROPE, supra note 1 1, at 63. Note that this device per
forms "exactly the same function as pledge." HORN ET AL supra note 61, at 186. As
in retention of title, fiduciary transfer of title evolved from articles of the German Civil
Code permitting full transfer of title to goods without relinquishing possession. See
BGB art. 930.
76. See SECURITY IN EUROPE, supra note 1 1, at 63. Notice that this sort of non
possessory arrangement contravenes the policy of the Civil Code provisions on pledge,
especially given that the security interest is completely secret as the debtor retains os
tensible ownership. Nonetheless, business practice in Germany demanded such a device,
and the judiciary "made short shrift of [legal] scruples," thus accommodating practical
demands as case law forged the new device from parts of the existing law. See id.;
HORN ET AL supra note 61, at 186 ("With the invention of security title
owner
ship has gained a new function, for which it is perhaps formally too powerful.").
77. See SECURITY IN EUROPE, supra note 1 1, at 64. One source suggests that, in
the absence of contrary indications in the agreement, the creditor must dispose of the
collateral in a way leading to the "most favorable result possible, tal<lng into account
the circumstances." Stoll, supra note 65, at 188.
78. See CIS CONFERENCE, supra note 8, at 56 (comments of Professor Stephan
Breidenbach of the European University "Viadrina," Frankfurt/Oder).
79. See supra notes 68-71.
.,
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tion of the German bench was crucial to the success of this, in effect,
fraudulent practice,80 and any enterprising creditor should assure herself
in advance, to the extent possible, that the members of the Russian judi
ciary would be as accommodating as their German colleagues to this
aberrant scheme.81
B.

The Myth of Creditor Machinations and the Adverse Effects of
Attempts to Control T hem
Perhaps the most compelling reason for imposing a vilriety of re

straints on the disposition of repossessed collateral is the desire to pro
tect the debtor from a potentially overreaching, uncaring, and generally
abusive creditor. Lawmakers feel that the creditor occupies a position of
advantage over the debtor from the beginning and that, in order to level
the playing field, the law must make every provision for controlling
possible abuse by the creditor. This section argues that such fears are
largely unfounded and that the restrictions of the Russian law on credi
tors' options for disposing of repossessed collateral are potentially
counterproductive. Section 11.B.1 examines the concerns that generally
compel policymakers to inhibit creditor freedom and submits that they
are misplaced because the interests of debtor and creditor often coin
cide, especially at the stage of disposition of the collateral. Section
11.B.2 demonstrates that the specific Russian provisions on public sale
of the collateral exacerbate potential problems with abusive creditor
tactics.
1.

Shortsighted Debtor Protection and Creditors' Vested Interest in
Maximizing Resale Proceeds
Lawmakers have been admirably concerned with the plight of se

cured debtors from the early days of the formation of debtor-creditor
policy. In his presentation of the

pledge

section of the Code Napoleon

to the French Legislative Body, Berlier82 expressed his fear that, since
" [t]he creditor makes the law for his debtor" in a pledge transaction, an
otherwise "undoubtedly" positive means of securing the performance
of obligations might become "odious and contrary to public policy if its

80. See supra note 76. Judicial cooperation was similarly essential to the advent of
security title in the Netherlands. See SE CURITY IN EUROPE, supra note 1 1 , at 126;
SCHUIT ET AL., supra note 41, § 7.02[1] [c].
81. A recent expression of the Supreme Court and the Supreme Arbitration Court's
view of current law seems to curtail hope for potential Russian judicial activism. See
Postanovlenie, supra note 26.
82. See supra note 52.
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result were to enrich the creditor while ruining the debtor. "83 Un
restricted creditor freedom might give rise to fraud on the part of
"greedy creditors," who, the argument goes, would seek to "procur[e]
an excessive interest" by assigning only an insignificant value to the
otherwise highly valuable collateral.84
To avoid this problem, policymakers had to decide upon an appro
priate mechanism for controlling the untrustworthy creditor and stand
ardize the greatest return from the collateral. The debtor "finds his
guarantee and his safeguard in the publicity of the sale, that is to say, in
the call to the bidders, whose presence and competition give [the
debtor] in some way the assurance that the pledge will be taken at its
just value. "85 Public auction was supposed to shield the debtor from the
chicanery in which the creditor normally would engage if she were
given free reign over the sale procedure.86
The virtues of obligatory public auction were subject to dispute,
however, from the very beginning. One member of the French Conseil
d'Etat suggested omitting the second clause of article 2078 from the
Code, thereby permitting the parties to derogate in the security agree
ment from the general restriction where it suited them.87 Berlier
strongly opposed this proposition. He suspected that if the protection of
the debtor were left to the will of the parties, the creditor would be free
to impose upon the debtor her will from a superior bargaining position.
In such case, "a creditor of a sum of 1000 francs who held in pledge an
asset worth 3000 francs would rush to sell it at an unfair price in order
to be more promptly paid."88 In such a way, the security agreement
might "degenerate into a usurious contract."89 Thus, as Berlier's posi-

83. FENET, supra note 53, at 206.
84. DURANTON, supra note 54, § 537.
85. PoNT, supra note 54, § 1 153. Another commentator quotes the "orator of the
Government" as asserting that public sale "assures the most favorable conditions for
the realization of the pledge." 2 ALAUZET, supra note 8, § 792.
86. See PONT, supra note 54, § 1158 (noting that provisions in the security agree
ment permitting derogation from the law are likely to "place the debtor at the mercy of
the creditor").
87. See FENET, supra note 53, at 197. See supra note 58 for the text of the second
part of article 2078.
88. FENET, supra note 53, at 197; see also PONT, supra note 54, § 1 156. Nicolas
Ollivant of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development paints a very dif
ferent, and probably more accurate, picture of the foreclosure sale: "[W]hen there is a
default on a payment, the bank moves in and takes the assets, which instead of being
worth 200% of the loan, suddenly, magically, become worth maybe 50% of the loan."
CIS CONFERENCE, supra note 8, at 79.
89. Bon.Eux, supra note 57, at 131. Boileux further explains that " [the] sole goal
of the [intervention of the court] is to protect the debtor from a usurious convention."
Id. at 133. He apparently has little confidence in the moral standards of any creditor, as
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tion finally emerged as the norm, both the letter and the spirit of the
law seemingly aimed to protect the debtor.90
Berlier's view of the rapacious creditor is subject to challenge on
several fronts. First, while in some discrete circumstances the debtor
may need protection, at the outset it must be emphasized that the nor
mal creditor is just as averse as the debtor, if not indeed more so, to
foreclosure and forced liquidation of the collateral.91 Creditors take se
curity interests not to profit at the expense of debtors who are likely to
default, but in order to protect themselves if the debtor proves unable to
fulfill her obligations. No rational creditor actually desires to subject
herself, and the collateral on which she depends to satisfy the debt, to
the process of foreclosure and realization - a process invariably at
tended by an increase in transaction costs and a risk of inadequate
retum.92
Even in the rare case when the possibility of a surplus from a sale
exists, the creditor has every incentive to maximize resale price imme
diately so as to avoid any possibility of the need to resort to the judicial
process to regain the remainder of the outstanding debt.93 While resale
he notes that "[o]therwise the creditor would never miss the opportunity to employ this
means to escape the prohibitive rules of article 2078." Id. at 134. Boileux would "al
ways presume" that predefault agreements providing the creditor with greater flexibility
"mask usury," and that the debtor, subjugated to the will of the creditor by life's cir
cumstances, signed an adhesive agreement. See id. He concludes solemnly that "[t]he
law uncovers fraud no matter under what veil it conceals itself." Id.
90. See PONT, supra note 54, § 1 148.
9 1 . See, e.g., Aubrey L. Diamond, The Reform of the Law of Security Interests, in
42 CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 1989, at 231 (Roger Rideout & Jeffrey Jowell eds.,
1990).

Most creditors holding security interests will agree that the last thing they wish to
do is to enforce the security interest. What they want is payment of the debt, and
they do not wish to undergo the trouble and expense of enforcement, which is re
garded very much as a last resort.
Id. at 231-32; see also William B. Davenport, Default, Enforcement and Remedies

Under Revised Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 7 VAL. U. L. REv. 265, 267
(1973) ("Naturally, the consequences of default are the last things that any party to a
secured transaction wants to consider, and the default itself the last thing that any party
wants to happen."). These comments are corroborated by Nicolas Ollivant, Credit Of
ficer at the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development in London: "Banks
never want to take the collateral and have to sell it. It is a difficult, time consuming,
frustrating, and ultimately loss making process." CIS CONFERENCE, supra note 8, at
78.
92. One commentator aptly points out that any creditor who purposely seeks out
debtors likely to default and secures the debts relying on the eventual opportunity to
profit upon realization of the collateral "is usually either a knave or a fool." Hogan,
supra note 25, at 205. For an early contrary view, see supra note 89. .
93. See, e.g., CIS CONFERENCE, supra note 8, at 58 (comments of Professor
Breidenbach recognizing that the interests of the debtor and creditor at disposition are
"at least partially identical"). For an excellent and highly detailed examination and cri-
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of the collateral is costless to the creditor - given that the expenses of
the sale are secured by the sale proceeds ·along. with the amount of the
secured debt94 - any amount the creditor manages to regain against the
odds in a deficiency proceeding comes at the dear price of great ex
penditures of time, money, and nerves. Schwartz sums up the situation
·

well:

Perhaps a more concise way of putting this is that every dollar the credi
tor nets by resale reduces the outstanding debt by a dollar; every dollar
the creditor defers to the deficiency action to collect will reduce the out
standing debt by less than a dollar because the expected value of a litiga
tion dollar is less than one, these dollars being subject to risk and delay.95

Any creditor who hopes to wring any more than the collateral out of the
defaulting debtor exposes herself to the constant risk of imminent insol
vency of a person who has once already proven unable to repay her fi
nancial obligations.
Second, the fear that collateral with a value greatly exceeding the
amount of the debt will be sold off by a thoughtless creditor for sub
stantially less than its "real worth" is, in most cases, unsupported by
the harsh realities of the forced resale market.96 Collateral, unfortu
nately, does not come with a neat price tag attached that explicitly indi
cates its "value." The value of an item must be determined according
to what the market will produce.97 One common indicator of "fair"
market value is the amount that a willing buyer under no compulsion to
purchase would offer for the item in an arm's length sale by a willing
seller under no compulsion to sell.98 In the context of a forced disposi
tion following default, neither the creditor nor the debtor is a particu
larly willing seller. This makes it difficult to achieve or even to predict

tique of the proposition that creditors fail to maximize resale prices on a consistent ba
sis, see Alan Schwartz, The Enforceability of Security Interests in Consumer Goods, 26
J.L. & EcoN. 1 17, 124-39 (1983). In an appendix to his article, Schwartz provides a
complex mathematical proof of his claim that creditors always benefit from maximizing
the proceeds of collateral sales. See id. at 161-62.
94. See GK RF art. 337 ("[A] pledge shall secure . . . the compensation of the
necessary expenses of the creditor for the maintenance of the collateral and expenses for
recovery.").
95. Schwartz, supra note 93, at 127. Another detailed mathematical proof accom
panies this proposal. See id. at 127-28.
96. Consider also Professor Kripke's misgivings about the value-protecting func
tion of public disposition, infra note 121.
97. See generally BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 1 14 S. Ct. 1757 (1994) (discuss
ing "reasonably equivalent value" for foreclosed real property).
98. See, e.g., United States v. Cartwright, 41 1 U.S. 546, 551 (1973) (noting that
this test is "nearly as old as the federal income, estate, and gift taxes themselves").
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a fair market value for any given item, and the difficulty is enhanced
when the law compels the seller to use an inefficient public auction. .
The vultures that hover around public auction grounds all have the
same goal in mind: bid just enough to outdo the miser across the way,
but in any case keep the bid as low as possible to walk away with a
bargain piece of merchandise.99 No one can divine the price that any
particular group of bidders assembled at the auction block will be will
ing to pay for the collateral, particularly in remote regions where the
value of money is greater and the bidders are less familiar with such
sales than in the commercial centers.100 The function of the public auc
tion for the participants is certainly not to provide the debtor with the
protection of a fair price; on the contrary, the bidders want to take the
collateral for as little as possible, and they know that the cards are al
ready stacked in their favor by virtue of the circumstances of a forced
disposal.101
Finally, one might challenge the hypothetical vast· surplus that the
creditor supposedly lazily denies to the debtor upon hurried sale of the
collateral. Experience has shown that any surplus to be returned to the
debtor simply is not the norm for foreclosure sales; the concern of
every creditor is avoiding the expected deficiency.102 Even in the rare
case when the creditor obtains a surplus from disposition of the collat99. Grant Gilmore characterized the typical assembly of bidders at public foreclo
sure auctions as being "about as lively as a group of mourners at a funeral." GILMORE,
supra note 1 1 , § 44.6, at 1242; see also United States v. Conrad Publishing Co., 589
F.2d 949 (8th Cir. 1 978). The majority in Conrad rejected a public auction based partly
on its feeling that it had been poorly attended and that the few bidders who did attend
showed little interest in the particular printing equipment being sold. See 589 F.2d at
951-52. The dissenting judge, however, retorted that while "only" 1 1 8 bidders attended
the auction, "the majority fails to recognize that in a typical sale of foreclosed property
one hundred sixteen fewer would have attended." 589 F.2d at 956 (Gibson, CJ., dis
senting). The dissenter remarked that the "number far exceeds the minimum to be ex
pected at a reasonably run auction of distressed goods." 589 F.2d at 956.
100. The accounts receivable of a large oil enterprise, for example, would sell for
significantly more on a Moscow market than at a general public auction in remote
Nizhnevartovsk. See also 2 ALAUZET, supra note 8, § 795, at 204 (discussing the supe
riority of Paris as a market for "diamonds or other objects that can be sold well only in
Paris"). For an example of one lawyer's attempted reliance on a more conservative, ru
ral economic perspective to avoid an anticipated greater valuation of damages by a New
York jury, see Gulf Oil v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1946).
101. Private negotiation would much more readily allow the seller to conceal from
potential buyers the fact of forced liquidation, allowing the seller to obtain a more rea
sonable return.
102. Recall the somber observation of Gilmore that " (t]he surplus to be returned
to the debtor after the sale is a glittering mirage; the deficiency judgment is the grim re
ality." GILMORE, supra note 1 1 , § 43.2, at 1 1 88. Gilmore continues by pointing out
that "nine times out of ten," the creditor is the ultimate purchaser of the collateral and
"pays not in cash but by a credit against the debt." Id. § 43.2, at 1 1 88-89. This lends
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eral, it would be more efficient to control the occasional abusive credi
tor by some sort of judicial scrutiny of the resale procedure rather than
by encumbering all resales with the public auction requirement.103
Even more so than their counterparts in North America or Europe,
creditors in Russia have a vested interest in immediately maximizing
the return upon disposition of collateral. Conditions in Russia place sig
nificant obstacles in the way of any creditor considering playing the
market to evade her responsibilities to the debtor. The Russian market
lacks consistent indicators that might allow the creditor to rely on ob
taining any certain price for the collateral; to avoid great risk, she must
pursue the disposition mechanism with the greatest potential for return.
If a deficiency remains, the creditor will be hard pressed to obtain full
repayment from a debtor teetering on the verge of bankruptcy. Espe
cially in the dynamic Russian economy, "public policy should no
longer be made on the assumption that creditors do not maximize; the
assumption must be the other way."104
2.

Specific Potential for Abuse in the Russian Sale Procedure

The procedures prescribed by Russian law for conducting the auc
tion increase the potential for abusive creditor tactics. In fact, they place
the debtor in a substantially worse position than if the initial realization
procedure allowed for greater flexibility. By waiting until the situation
becomes critical, the creditor can appropriate the devalued collateral
and realize a premium by reselling the collateral later. This danger ex
ists in more liberal systems as well, but the Russian system seems to
encourage such an outcome and lacks a ready, built-in response to
abuse.
Creditors have exploited the realization mechanism in the United
States also, and Professors White and Summers offer a caveat to debt
ors to be vigilant to such abuses:

even more urgency to the misgivings about the Russian public auction procedure de
scribed infra section II.B.2.
103. See, e.g., 2 ALAUZET, supra note 8, § 793 (defending the greater freedom
given to the creditor by the French Commercial Code by noting that "all things may of
fer the potential for abuse," but explaining that the legislators could not "sacrifice a
principle of a great and incontestable utility, in the majority of cases, to entirely excep
tional circumstances"); CIS CONFERENCE, supra note 8, at 58 (comments of Professor
Breidenbach observing that an obligation for the creditor to act reasonably and to pay
reparations for acting unreasonably provides sufficient protection to the debtor);
Schwartz, supra note 93, at 124 ("Article 9 of the UCC apparently responds intelli
gently to the occasional cases of creditors' venality or sloth that will inevitably arise.").
104. Schwartz, supra note 93, at 139.
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[S]ome secured creditors will be tempted first to hold a procedurally
proper public sale where they buy the goods themselves for rather less
(perhaps much less) than a private sale would have brought, and thereaf

ter resell at a higher price through their private outlet - the outlet
through which they would have conducted a private sale had they done
so in the first place.105

Given a spiritless and poorly attended public auction, the creditor has
every incentive to "succumbO to the natural temptation of ' buying' the
property from himself at a fraction of its fair value."106 But the "com
mercially reasonable" standard of the North American systems1 07 acts
as the necessary disincentive to such schemes and allows the debtor to
challenge this sort of manipulation.
The Russian law lacks any such explicit remedy. Under the current
Code, avaricious creditors might exploit the abusive opportunity to reap
a double benefit from the collateral in at least two ways. First, creditors
certainly could apply to the Russian system the buy-and-resell scheme
against which White and Summers forewarn. The creditor may bid at
the auction, and as long as one more person appeared at the auction
(perhaps someone enticed by the creditor) and either of them raised the
initial bidding price by so much as a ruble,1 08 the creditor could walk
away from the auction with a bargain piece of collateral that might be
sold subsequently in a different market under more conducive condi
tions for significantly more money. The debtor would remain liable for

105. 4 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 31, § 34-11; see also In re Zsa Zsa Ltd.,
352 F. Supp. 665, 671 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (noting that judicial scrutiny of the auction price
compared to estimated value is "especially appropriate where self dealing is alleged"),
affd., 475 F.2d 1393 (2d Cir. 1 973). Jn one particularly egregious case of a creditor buy
low-sell-high scheme, the creditor bought the collateral at public auction for $155,000
and then transferred it to a private party with whom he had concluded a contract in ad
vance to resell the collateral for $950,000. See Boender v. Chicago North Clubhouse
Assn., 608 N.E.2d 207 (Ill. App. 1992). The court noted that " [i]t is difficult to imagine
a factual situation where self-dealing by the secured creditor is more apparent" 608
N.E.2d at 212. A less shocking example appears in Savage Constr. v. Challenge-Cook
Bros., 714 P.2d 573 (Nev. 1986), similarly involving a prearranged resale to a third
party by the creditor following public auction. There the numbers were not so disparate:
$158,000 auction price as compared to resale at $193,000 (still, a tidy profit of $35,000
to the crafty creditor convinced the court to remedy this situation as well). See Savage
Construction, 714 P.2d at 574; see also Connex Press, Inc. v. Intl. Airmotive, Inc., 436
F. Supp. 51, 53 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (aircraft purchased for $325,000, resold for $855,000);
Levers v. Rio King Land & Inv. Co., 560 P.2d 917, 918-19 (Nev. 1977) (ranch supplies
purchased for $100, resold for $10,000); Cornett v. White Motor Corp., 209 N.W.2d
341 (Neb. 1973) (45 new garbage trucks purchased for $382,500, resold after cleaning
and repair for $577,500).
106. GILMORE, supra note 1 1 , § 44.6, at 1242.
107. See infra note 127 and section II.C.2.
108. See supra note 30 and accompanying text
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the deficiency,109 and the creditor might receive a hefty windfall, de
pending upon the particular circumstances of the case.
Second, creditors can take advantage of the public-private price
discrepancy even more efficiently under the Russian law by waiting un
til the auction fails. If the debtor somehow convinces the creditor to
agree to a relatively high initial bidding price, the creditor can smile
and wait for the auction to take place. When no bidders show up, or if
those few bidders who do appear balk at the price, and the auction is
declared void, the creditor can blithely refuse to take the collateral at
the asking price and await a second auction.110 When the second auction
again proves fruitless, the creditor can take the collateral at a ten per
cent discount and return to any remaining assets of the debtor for any
deficiency.111 This statutory scheme produces the same result as the bid
ding scenario described above, but the creditor is not even inconve
nienced with the burden of bidding. She can simply bide her time if she
feels that public auction at the agreed price is futile. As soon as the
debtor ambles into the trap, the creditor snaps the door closed, taking
the debtor for a possible deficiency and reselling the ill-gotten gain later
for a tidy profit.
While judicial scrutiny may remedy some instances of this abuse,
it is not clear that this practice is even prohibited by Russian law. Al
lowing the creditor to proceed directly to a private sale, while imposing
a duty to justify that procedure, would better combat the potential ill ef
fects of manipulation of the sale.
C.

The Lessons of North American History and Practice

This section focuses on the process in North America of searching
for and choosing a realization mechanism that most efficiently and eq
uitably balances debtor protection and creditor discretion. It submits
that the U.S. commercial law experts who drafted Article 9 of the Uni
form Commercial Code ("Article 9"),

as well as the Canadian

lawmakers who subsequently adopted almost identical provisions, relied
on compelling grounds in allowing the creditor greater flexibility in dis
posing of the collateral. Drawing on the insight and experience of
American courts and commentators, this section also exposes the pit
falls of actual practice with public auctions of collateral. While Russia's
economic situation is clearly unique, the concerns of secured lenders
and the components of a successful system of security are the same in

109. See GK RF art. 350(5).
1 10. See supra notes 30, 33 and accompanying text
1 1 1. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
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almost any context - including Russia today. Section II.C.1 recalls the
predecessor acts that were the focus of the drafting process of the de.,.
fault section of Article 9, placing particular emphasis on the reasoning
that motivated the drafters' choice of flexible disposal provisions from
among many such norms available at the time. This examination is sup
plemented by a brief discussion of the Canadian decision to adopt dis
position provisions very similar to those in Article 9. Section II.C.2
demonstrates the unfortunate reality of allowing creditors to rely on
public auction to the detriment of debtors. It examines U.S. judicial ex
perience that has shown that public auction is sometimes a commer
cially unreasonable means of. producing an optimal return from collat
eral. Section II.C.3 concludes with some final challenges to the
expediency of public auction.
1.

The Central Choice in the Development of an American
Realization Mechanism

The liberal provisions for realization of repossessed collateral in
Part 5 of Article 9 represent the fruits of an arduous process of compar
ing the various components comprising the previous, disjointed law of
secured transactions in the United States. When the Uniform Commis
sioners undertook the task of formulating a standard norm to be applied
to the disposition of collateral after default, they narrowed their options
to two opposing paradigms from previous uniform acts.112 On the one
hand, the Uniform Conditional Sales Act insisted on sale of the goods
at public auction and prescribed an elaborate procedure of notices, loca
tions, and time periods for conducting the auction.113 The realization
provisions of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act in many ways resem
ble the modem limitations previously des¢ribed.

1 12. See U.C.C. § 9-504 cmt. 1 (1990).
1 13. See UNIF. CoNDmONAL SALES ACT § 19, Commissioners' Note (with
drawn 1943), 2 U.L.A. 30-31 n922); CO�NTARIES ON CONDmON4 SALES, 2A
U.L.A. § 1 17 (1924). One should note particularly that § 19 of the U.C.S.A. prescribed
public auction only when the debtor had already paid 50% of the purchase price of the
goods. "If he ha[d] paid less, statistics show[ed] that nothing is realized for the buyer
on a resale. The depreciation of the goods more than eats up the buyer's equity. Where
there is no chance of benefiting the buyer, a compulsory resale is a useless and expen
sive fonnality." UNIF. CoNDmONAL SALES ACT § 19, commissioners' note, 2 U.L.A.
34 (1922). Under § 20 of the Act, the buyer could always demand a resale, even if she
had only paid an insignificant portion of the purchase price, but the Commissioners
considered it "undesirable to· require such resale as a matter of law in cases where busi
ness experience shows that it can do no good." UNIF. CoNDmoNAL SALES ACT § 19,
commissioners' note, 2 U.L.A. 34 (1922). Thus, the requirement of public auction was
looked upon only with reserved favor even at its prime in American law. .

282

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 95:255

Standing on the opposite end of the spectrum, the Uniform Trust
Receipts -Act allowed the creditor much more freedom to choose the
most efficient realization mechanism.114 The drafters of the Uniform
Trust Receipts Act believed that the provisions for obliging the creditor
to return to the debtor any surplus from the sale adequately "pre
serve[d] the [debtor's] protection against forfeiting his equity of re
demption." 115 Most importantly, the drafters asserted that "by simplify
ing the procedure and giving certainty of security, the Act cheapens the
dealer's financing, which in turn redounds to the benefit of the consum
ing public." 1 1 6
The functionality and freedom of the Trust Receipts Act eventually
emerged as the choice for the new Article 9, and the comments of two
prominent scholars closely connected with the drafting effort explain
this result First, Harold Birnbaum, who acted as advisor to the report
ers for Article 9, rejected the notion that the flexible option chosen was
unduly favorable to secured creditors.117 He defended the loosening of
restrictions by pointing to the desired benefits of eliminating "wasteful
expenses" connected with secured lending and ultimately reducing the
cost of secured credit to the consuming public.118 Birnbaum counted this

1 14. Upon default, the creditor could take possession of and was then empowered
to sell the goods, documents, or instruments covered by the trust receipt "at public or
private sale." UNIF. TRUST RECEIPTS ACT § 6(3)(b) (withdrawn 1951), 9C U.L.A. 247
(1957). The creditor was obligated to account to the debtor for any surplus from the
sale remaining after payment of the debt, but she retained the right subsequently to
claim a deficiency if the proceeds fell short of the amount owed. See UNIF. TRUST RE
CEIPTS ACT § 6(3)(b) (withdrawn 1951), 9C U.L.A. 247 (1 957).
1 15. UNIF. TRUST RECEIPTS ACT. Commissioners' Prefatory Note, 9C U.L.A.
226 (1957).
1 1 6. UNIF. TRUST RECEIPTS ACT, Commissioners' Prefatory Note, 9C U.L.A.
226 (1957). The Commissioners further asserted that " [t]he Act works to the interest of
trust receipt financers
by making their foreclosure procedure clear and workable,"
while it "works to the interest of trust receipt borrowers . . . by cheapening their financ
ing, [and] increasing the realization on security at foreclosure sale." UNIF. TRUST RE
CEIPTS ACT, Commissioners' Prefatory Note, 9C U.L.A. 229 (1957).
1 17. See Harold F. Birnbaum, Article 9
A Restatement and Revision of Chattel
Security, 1952 WIS. L. REv. 348, 389-90.
1 1 8. See id.; see also Schwartz, supra note 93, at 1 17 ("Consumers who grant se
curity interests to creditors pay lower interest rates in return . . . . "); infra note 129.
Birnbaum's comments reflect the policy struggle to which the disposition provi
sions of Article 9 responded. The drafters attempted to achieve the elusive and delicate
balance between two policy positions: "one, a desire to impede dishonest dispositions,
and the other, a reluctance to strangle honest transactions with red tape.'' Hogan, supra
note 25, at 220; see also Grant Gilmore, Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code Part V: Default, 7 CoNF. ON PERS. FIN. L.Q. REP. 4, 7 (1952) (describing the goal of
avoiding either of two extremes: "setting the barriers against fraud so high that legiti
mate business operations are blocked
[or] setting them so low that fraud flourishes
unchecked"). But see CIS CONFERENCE, supra note 8, at 106 (comments of Aleksandr
.
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enhanced flexibility among the major advances of Article 9. He recog
nized that " [t]he rigid formality of old-fashioned foreclosures has often
resulted in loss to all except those who purchased at foreclosure
sales. " 1 19
Second, Grant Gilmore, a preeminent scholar of personal property
security in the United States and Associate Reporter for Article 9, ex
pressed his even greater conviction that more liberal realization provi
sions were superior to the old limited mechanisms. 120 Gilmore chal
lenged the Uniform Conditional Sales Act's insistence on public
auction, declaring that it "guarant[eed] that the property would go for
less than it was worth." 1 21 Gilmore emphasized his "firmly held belief"
that requirements like the Russian public auction provision "make it
impossible to dispose of the collateral at a decent price." 122 While rec
ognizing that the limitations were designed with protection of the debtor
in mind, Gilmore lamented the fact that "the cure . . . [had] proved
worse than the disease." 1 23
Moreover, Gilmore challenged the effectiveness of public auction
in preventing fraud. He insisted that rigid statutory procedures, like the
Makovskii outlining his concerns about the untoward effects of foreclosures on consum
ers who might "end up as a practical matter with absolutely nothing, thrown out onto
the street").
1 19. Birnbaum, supra note 1 17, at 390; see also Davenport, supra note 91, at 306
("Much of the credit for [the complete taking hold of Article 9] must go to the flexibil
ity of the Code provisions.").
120. See Grant Gilmore, The Secured Transactions Article of the Commercial
Code, 1 6 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 27 (1951).
121. Gilmore, supra note 1 18, at 7. Compare Gilmore's appraisal with the com
ments of Homer Kripke, a former member of the Subcommittee of the American Law
Institute on Article 9: "Everybody knows in practice that public sales are usually per
functory, and nobody bids but the creditor." Homer Kripke, Kentucky Modernizes the

Law of Chattel Security, 48 KY. LJ. 369, 386 (1960).
Moreover, Kripke questions the very necessity of a foreclosure and sale if the sup
posed value in the collateral to be protected by public auction actually exists. If the
debtor expected to reap any significant gain from the sale of the collateral, Kripke ar
gues, the debtor would not leave the details of the sale to the creditor. She would sell
the goods herself to avoid default and completely escape any danger of creditor negli
gence, or the debtor would find substitute financing using the valuable collateral as se
curity. See id. The debtor's inability to rely on either of these escape devices shows that
the value expected from a general offering to the public in the area where the debtor has
been conducting business all along likely will not produce any excess return.
122. Gilmore, supra note 120, at 43.
123. Id. Despite Gilmore's seemingly strong aversion to public auction, he initially
backed away from this position by indicating that the creditor might always permissibly
choose public auction over private sale. See Gilmore, supra note 1 18, at 10. Later,
though, after another prominent commentator challenged this proposition, Gilmore re
canted and recognized that the challenger was "obviously right" about public auction
potentially failing the commercial reasonableness test. See GILMORE, supra note 1 1,
§ 44.6, at 1245 & n.12.
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requirement of public auction, have always been and will always be in
capable of preventing actual fraud: "On the rockiest ledge, in the tiniest
cranny, through the most nearly invisible loophole, fraud knows how to
flourish luxuriantly. This is disquieting but true." 124 Public auction pro
ceedings, Gilmore explained, are commonly dominated by "local gangs
of thieves" who appropriate the collateral through collusive bidding ar
rangements only to "grow fat" later by selling their ill-gotten gain on a
more conducive market.125 Far from accomplishing its goal of debtor
protection, the public auction requirement in fact shifts the benefit away
from the debtor to those who least deserve it.
Eventually, lawmakers in several of the Canadian provinces recog
nized the potential benefits to debtors and creditors of the flexible ap
proach taken by their southern neighbor, so they enacted the Personal
Property Security Act ("PPSA").126 The disposition provisions of the
PPSA track those in Article 9.127 Just as in the United States, the Cana
dian drafters chose this "simple, efficient, and flexible tool" and re
jected any rigid requirement of public auction on the assumption that
private sales by way of regular commercial channels would protect the
interests of both debtors and creditors by producing greater returns than
public auction would.128

124. Gilmore, supra note 120, at 44. Compare this skeptical appraisal with the
averment of Boileux concerning the capacity of the law to uncover fraud. See supra
note 89 and accompanying text.
125. See Gilmore, supra note 120, at 43; see also supra notes 105-1 1 , 1 1 9 and ac
companying text.
126. R.S.O., ch. P.10 (1990) (Ont.). Since the provisions of the PPSA have under
gone only slight alterations in subsequent adoptions by other provinces, this section fo
cuses on the language appearing in the law of Ontario, the first province to enact the
PPSA.
127. See Personal Property Security Act, R.S.O., ch. P.10, §§ 58-66 (1990). The
PPSA permits the creditor to dispose of the collateral "by public sale, private sale, lease
or otherwise and . . . may be made at any time and place and on any terms so long as
every aspect of the disposition is commercially reasonable." Personal Property Security
Act, R.S.O., ch. P.10, § 63(2) (1990).
128. See 2 RICHARD H. McLAREN & KATHERINE DE JONG, SECURED TRANS
ACTIONS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY IN CANADA § 23.03[2] (Supp. 1986). Similar re
form sentiments have been voiced on the other side of the border as well. Alejandro
Garro delivered a particularly vehement attack on the public auction regime in the states
of his native South America:
A fair determination of the parties' mutual rights does not have to suffer because
of the need to dispose of the collateral in a costly and cumbersome public sale.
Any collateral realization system which demands a sale by public auction is
bound to work inefficiently. Most public sales are sparsely attended and conse
quently prices are notoriously low, to the detriment of both the secured creditor
and the debtor. The obvious justification for requiring a sale by a public official
is that the debtor is afforded some needed protection. But even this purpose is not

October 1996]

Note - Russian Secured Transactions

285

The malleable provisions of Article 9 and the PPSA have enjoyed
success in North America because of their free adaptability to any situa
tion, allowing the parties to arrive at the most acceptable means of reap
ing the benefit of their security agreement. The policyma1cers who
formed these provisions shared the same concern for debtor protection
that motivated Russian legislators to impose the public auction restric
tion. But the North American approach bestows the benefit from the
disposition on the parties who deserve protection, rather than on bargain
shoppers at public auction. The more flexible provisions acknowledge
that an optimal return on collateral is the best form of protection for
both parties.129 U.S. and Canadian lawmakers recognized that regular
commercial �hannels are predisposed to producing acceptable returns,
and they feared that public auction most often produces just the oppo
site effect. But rather than make a rigid choice responsive to only one
subset of transactions, the North American drafters left the choice to
those familiar with the factors at hand at any given moment, including
the particular conditions of the agreement, market conditions, and other
similarly unpredictable contingencies. Lawmakers did not cede total
control to the parties, as the next section demonstrates, but their com
promise provides much-needed flexibility in modern commercial trans
actions in a rapidly and unpredictably changing market.
2.

Judicial Practice and Commercial Unreasonableness

The drafters of Article 9 provided creditors with a flexible standard
for realization of collateral, but they tempered this flexibility with an
explicit protective requirement that "every aspect of the disposition in
cluding the method, manner, time, place and terms must be commer-

accomplished because many of the public auctions are controlled by hired bid
ders who dominate the auction and restrain bidding.
Alejandro M. Garro , Security Interests in Personal Property in Latin America: A Com
parison with Article 9 and a Model for Reform, 9 Hous. J. INTL. L. 157, 235-36

(1987).
129. French lawmakers recognized the reciprocal benefits available to the debtor
by protecting the creditor when they were adopting their new Commercial Code:
There is no doubt that . . . when every lender secured by commercial pledge
will be sure of recovering his loan easily, without costs and on the appointed day,
there will be a greater number of bankers and capitalists disposed to lend to com
merce with the security of a pledge, and that they will lend at a more moderate
rate of interest One can thus say here that to favor the creditor is in fact to favor
the debtor.
2 ALAUZET, supra note 8, § 792, at 199 (quoting the "orator of the Government" as he
presented the proposed article .93 of the Commercial Code on commercial pledge to the
French Legislative Body).
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cially reasonable. "130 Under this standard, even the very question of
which type of sale to hold - public or private - falls within the ambit
of the judicial inquiry, and practice has shown that public sales of col
lateral are not always reasonable. U.S. courts have gone so far as to
proscribe public auction as an unacceptable evasion of the creditor's
commercial obligations to the debtor.
In the seminal case of Old Colony Trust Co. v. Penrose Industries
Corp., 131 the unique nature of the collateral posed difficulties for its ef
fective disposition, and the uncooperative debtors consistently opposed
any sort of sale.132 The creditor initially considered the option of a pub
lic auction, but the "experienced advice " of an appraiser indicated that
a private, negotiated sale would produce a better return.133 The court
concluded that private or "negotiated" sale may have been the only
commercially reasonable option. Given that the debtors vehemently op
posed any sale that they did not favor, the creditors had to conduct ex
tensive negotiations of the terms of any contract to sell the collateral a procedure that would have been impossible in a public disposition.134
While the Old Colony Trust court only hinted at the potential irra
tionality of public sale, two other courts subsequently solidified that
principle. In United States v. Terrey135 the creditor admitted that nor
mally public auction was "the last resort for disposition. "136 Nonethe
less, ignoring private offers that exceeded the auctioneer 's estimate
nearly sevenfold, the creditor proceeded to sell off the collateral piece
meal at a well-attended auction137 for approximately one-fifth of the
amount of the private offers.138 Sale of one portion of the collateral

130. U.C.C. § 9-504(3) (1990). The same standard appears in the Canadian PPSA.

See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
131. 280 F. Supp. 698 (E.D. Pa.), affd., 398 F.2d 310 (3d Cir. 1968).
132. See 280 F. Supp. at 703. The collateral consisted of the common stock of a
radio station. See 280 F. Supp. at 702-03.
133. See 280 F. Supp. at 704 n.7 ("Public bidding apparently depressed the value
of a radio station until the closing because it adversely affected earnings by deterring
advertising contracts and depressing employee morale.").
134. See 280 F. Supp. at 713.
135. 554 F.2d 685 (5th Cir. 1977).
136. 554 F.2d at 689.
137. The publicity created by the "experienced auctioneer" whom the creditor had
hired attracted a crowd of 106 bidders. See 554 F.2d at 690. It is particularly noteworthy
that even with this substantial attendance and an experienced auctioneer, the sale pro
duced an abnormally low return. Part of the problem was an auctioneer who was unfa
miliar with the collateral, who "did not know the difference in value between a ninety
cent optical coupler and a one-cent capacitor," both of which comprised a significant
portion of the collateral. 554 F.2d at 690. One can be sure that problems like these will
be even more prevalent with a court officer conducting the sale.
138. See 554 F.2d at 690.
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alone might have produced almost twice as much as the final auction
return, and this factor, among others, influenced the court to return the
case to the jury, who, the court thought, could reasonably have con
cluded that such a sale fell short of the standard of commercial reasona
bleness.139 Subsequently, in United States v. Willis,140 the court held that
the assumption that public auction was inherently reasonable was
"clearly false" and that the creditor had unreasonably chosen a public
over a private sale in the circumstances.141 In both Terrey and Willis,
public auction simply did not, and likely could not, produce a return su
perior to that of a private disposition. Without the commercial reasona
bleness standard applied through judicial supervision of these sales, the
debtors would have been the real victims in the end.
3.

Concluding Challenges

Current Russian law fails to take into account significant variances
in the marketability of various types of collateral, and it inhibits produc
tive reliance on modem means of commerce. Public auction may well
be the most efficient mechanism for disposing of certain kinds of collat
eral. For relatively fungible commodities that are widely traded at auc
tions, such as livestock142 and moderate quantities of certain consumer
goods, a local auction may be a completely appropriate means of realiz
ing an acceptable return on the collateral. The option of conducting a

public auction when such a mechanism is appropriate should endure. 143

Many other categories of collateral, on the other hand, are particu
larly poor candidates for public auction and logically should be dis
posed of privately. This group includes such common collateral items as

139. See 554 F.2d at 695-96.
140. 593 F.2d 247 (6th Cir. 1979).
141. See 593 F.2d at 258-59. The creditor had received private offers for the col
lateral for significantly more than both the amount initially estimated by the auctioneer
and the amount actually realized at the auction. See 593 F.2d at 250, 259.
142. See BARKLEY CLARK, THE LAW OF SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE <JI 4.08[2] (2d ed. 1988); Davenport, supra note
91, at 285.
143. Even in situations in which public auctions are appropriate, the proper forum
for the sale is not the courthouse steps. An experienced auctioneer should conduct the
proceedings, not a moonlighting court officer. U.S. courts have invalidated auctions and
reproached creditors for failing to retain experienced auctioneers. See, e.g., Liberty Natl.
Bank & Trust Co. of Okla. City v. Acme Tool Div. of the Rucker Co., 540 F.2d 1375,
1381-82 (10th Cir. 1976). Creditors should be allowed to take advantage of at least this
simple value-adding factor. The benefit derived from professional handling of the sale
will, in most cases, far outweigh any slight increase in procedural costs.
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large factory equipment, 144 oil rigs, 145 and large quantities of most sorts
of inventory146 that simply would not fmd an appropriate buyer at the
average public auction. More exotic collateral and goods that appeal
only to a particular discrete group of potential buyers, such as Lear
jets,147 specialized inventory,148 and specialized farm and other equip
ment, 149 are all the more ill-suited to liquidation through general public
offering. As one U.S. court has observed, "it is obvious that in dispos
ing of unique collateral the secured party must make significant at
tempts to reach the most logical purchasers." 150 If legislators truly wish
to protect the debtor, they should permit the creditor to utilize the most
reliable means possible of profitably disposing of these items. In many,

144. See, for example, United States v. Conrad Publishing Co., 589 F.2d 949 (8th
Cir. 1978) (printing equipment, including presses, cameras, stitchers, etc.).
145. See, e.g., Liberty Natl. Bank & Trust Co. v. Acme Tool Div. of the Rucker
Co., 540 F.2d 1375 (10th Cir. 1976).
146. See, e.g., Ace Parts & Distribs. v. First Natl. Bank of Atlanta, 245 S.E.2d
3 1 4, 315 (Ga Ct App. 1 978) ("thousands upon thousands of automobile parts");
Chrysler Credit Corp. v. B.J.M., Jr., Inc., 834 F. Supp. 813 (E.D. Pa. 1993), affd., 30
F.3d 1485 (3d Cir. 1994). One might think that a public auction of the inventory of a
car dealership would attract many eager buyers who would be willing to pay a fair
amount for a new automobile. But the court in Chrysler Credit acknowledged the sage
advice of a marketing expert who explained that Chrysler Credit had consistently sold
repossessed vehicles at limited dealer-only auctions, "and they usually [got] more for
the vehicles when they [sold] at a Chrysler-dealers only auction." 834 F. Supp. at 835;
see also Lloyd's Plan, Inc. v. Brown, 268 N.W.2d 192 (Iowa 1 978). In Lloyd's Plan, the
creditor repossessed an automobile, advertised it publicly, and received offers of $2475
and $2895. Finally, though, it sold the automobile privately to its manager's secretary
for $3400. See 268 N.W.2d at 193.
147. See, e.g., In re Frazier, 93 B.R. 366 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1988). The court
here emphasizes that "[p]rocedures employed to sell small jet aircraft are matters par
ticularly within the knowledge of a small group of persons who are experts in the
highly technical endeavor." 93 B.R. at 368-69. The creditor should have relied on a
"limited pool of qualified commercial buyers" in order to remain within prevailing re
sponsible practice rather than the concededly "last resort" method of public auction.
See 93 B.R. at 370; see also Connex Press v. International Airmotive, 436 F. Supp. 51
(D.D.C. 1 977). While Connex Press involved a larger aircraft, the same problems arose,
given that " [p]lanes of this type had never been sold at public auction." 436 F. Supp. at
55.
148. See, e.g., Trimble v. Sonitrol of Memphis, 723 S.W.2d 633, 641 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1986) (security systems "salable only to the Sonitrol dealer network").
149. See, e.g., AgriStor Credit Corp. v. Radtke, 356 N.W.2d 856, 861 (Neb. 1984)
("[T]he best method to resell Harvestores [feed silos] was through a Harvestore agency
because ultimate reuse or resale requires dismantling, repair, new parts, and new assem
bling that all required special equipment Public sales produced poor results."); Associ
ates Capital Servs. Corp. v. Riccardi, 454 F. Supp. 832, 833 (D.R.I. 1978) ("unique
equipment" consisting of "a system of two-way communications components").
150. Pippin Way, Inc. v. Four Star Music Co. (In re Four Star Music Co.), 2 B.R.
454, 462 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1979).
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if not most, instances, this will involve some sort of private, negotiated
sale.
Many of these sales should be accomplished with the assistance of
the mechanisms already in place with the resources and experience to
handle particular sales in the most efficient manner.151 For example, pre
cious metals, gems,152 and securities, 153 likely to become increasingly
common sources of collateral in Russia, should be sold through ex
changes, where the forced nature of the sale can be hidden to avoid an
adverse effect on the value, and where experienced sellers combine with
sophisticated buyers to arrive at the most favorable price on the market
at any given time.154
Finally, with the aid of modem technology, private negotiation can
exploit markets far removed from the place of the collateral to secure a
significantly better price. Willing buyers may not want to take the long
and expensive trip from, for example, Moscow to Krasnoyarsk or Vla
divostok to attend an auction. These potential buyers may offer terms of
sale through private negotiation by phone, fax, and so on, that signifi
cantly eclipse the run-of-the-mill bid at public auction. This should be
particularly so in the case of collateral that appeals to a limited class of

151. See supra text accompanying notes 43-46.
152. See Alexander Kim, Foreign Firms Are Not Rushing Into Yakutiya But They
Have Their Eye On Her, REsPUBLIKA SAKHA, Mar. 1, 1995, at 2, available in LEXIS,
Busfin Library, SBE File (discussing the complexities associated with pledging precious
metals and gems).
153. In the United States, serious complications may accompany public auctions
of the myriad forms of unregistered securities that might be pledged to secure debt, par
ticularly commercial debt. Public auction of such securities might fall under the defini
tion of a "public offering" in § 5 of the American Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77a-77aa (1994), in which case the expense of preparing the required documentation
might destroy any possible return on the securities. See Peter F. Coogan, The New UCC
Article 9, 86 HAR.v. L. REv. 477, 521 & n.108 (1973); Davenport, supra note 91, at
294. For case treatment of this issue, see, for example, United States v. Custer Channel
Wmg Corp., 376 F.2d 675, 676 (4th Cir. 1967); SEC v. Guild Films Co., 279 F.2d 485
(2d Cir. 1960). While this problem might be unique to the broad American securities
laws, one should remain aware of the possibility of such a problem in developing secur
ities laws in other countries like Russia.
154. Moving the burden of resale from lenders, whose expertise and facilities are
normally limited to lending, to dealers, who possess the knowledge and resources to ef
fectuate productive sales, apparently figured prominently in the U.S. drafters' decision
to abandon strict adherence to public auctions. See U.C.C. § 9-507 cmt. 2 (1990) ("One
recognized method of disposing of repossessed collateral is for the secured party to sell
the collateral to or through a dealer - a method which in the long run may realize bet
ter average returns since the secured party does not usually maintain his own facilities
for making such sales.").
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purchasers. The higher price achieved through private, long-distance ne
gotiation would clearly benefit both the creditor and the debtor.155
In conclusion, it seems highly unlikely that public auctions in Eu
rope or Russia offer better potential for high returns than in the United
States. Moreover, the general weaknesses and potential for abuse of the
public auction mechanism are exacerbated by the dangers implicit in the
current Russian procedure for conducting the sale.156 Russian lawmakers
should alter in some way the present system of obligatory public auction and restricted access to commercial markets to avoid the clear po
tential for problems

more far-ranging than those

that disquieted

lawmakers originally.
ill.

PROPOSED ALTERNATIVES TO THE CURRENT REGIME

This Part argues that something closer to the North American ap
proach of optimal creditor freedom controlled by judicial review best
serves the interests of all concerned parties. W hile problems of the stan
dard of judicial review will require serious analysis and resolution of
difficult problems, legislators ought to fulfill their responsibilities to
their constituents by providing recourse to the most productive disposi
tion arrangement available.
Russian reformers might choose from among a number of interme
diate stages between the present law and the more liberal North Ameri
can system. First, the law might provide greater independence to the
parties. Rather than forcing the debtor and creditor to observe the public
auction restrictions regardless of their wishes, the law could allow the
parties to agree upon an alternate form of disposition after conclusion
of the security agreement. This option exists in one form or another in
all of the European systems analyzed above.
Whether the parties conclude such an agreement before or after de
fault, however, conservative critics might fear significant creditor pres
sure on the debtor to accede to the creditor's will.157 But despite the mi
nor differences in the debtor-creditor relationship before and after
default, it makes little difference when the parties are permitted to dero-

155. The Russian procedural law permits the parties to transport the collateral to
another, more suitable location for auction as one way of accomplishing a similar result.
See GPK RSFSR art. 398. This option, however, requires the mutual consent of the par
ties, who must bear the expense of transporting the collateral to the alternate location.
See GPK RSFSR art. 398. Moreover, even if the collateral can be relocated, it still must
be sold by public auction, with no opportunity to negotiate more favorable terms with a
private purchaser.
156. See supra section II.B.2.
157. The drafters of the Code Napoleon, for instance, were wary of creditor influ
ence before default, but not after. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.

·
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gate from the norm. As soon as the debtor takes possession of the loan,
the bargaining positions of the parties change fundamentally. The debtor
no longer finds herself at the mercy of the creditor; on the contrary, it is
the creditor who finds herself in a risky position. The creditor cannot
place inordinate pressure on the debtor before default because she can
not legally foreclose before then. The creditor might threaten the debtor
before default that every minor divergence from the agreement will re
sult not in renegotiation or cooperation by the creditor, but rather in im
mediate foreclosure.158 But foreclosure is most often not in the interest
of the creditor in any event. The only real leverage that the creditor can
apply after conclusion of the agreement and transfer of the loan funds is
the loss of future goodwill or, more precisely, fear that the creditor will .
withhold loan funds in the future. Yet this is the case after default as
well. As a first step, permitting any sort of agreement between the par
ties that allows them to diverge from the general rule of public sale in
troduces a bit more welcome flexibility into the realization procedure.
This first hesitant step of countenancing debtor-creditor agreement,
however, is both too restrictive and perhaps too permissive. If the credi
tor presents to the debtor a plan to dispose of the collateral to a private
party through negotiated sale, and if the creditor can prove a significant
likelihood of inferior return from public auction, why should the law al
low an intransigent, unsophisticated, or simply foolish debtor irration
ally to refuse such an option? What if, for instance, a bankrupt debtor
finds herself so far in debt to other creditors that she could care less
about the return to be gained from the collateral? A surplus will not in
ure to the debtor's benefit; it will simply trickle off to the remaining
creditors, and a subsequent deficiency claim will rank lower than all of
the other claims against which the debtor has sought protection in bank
ruptcy. The desire of the creditor to squeeze out as much value from the
collateral as possible is of no great concern to this insolvent and indif
ferent debtor. Permitting the debtor in this instance to inhibit the credi
tor's good faith efforts to seek out the most lucrative return on the col
lateral would be inefficient and unjust. On the other hand, it is no more
acceptable to allow the creditor to exert on the debtor some sort of un
desirable influence based on the creditor's superior bargaining position.
One should at least provide for judicial scrutiny of the agreement
process.

158. See, e.g., PONT, supra note 54, § 1 157. Professor Coogan also alludes to the
convincing force of such implicit creditor coercion: "The debtor's agreement after de
fault . . . is not likely to be given without his knowing on which side his bread is but
tered." Coogan, supra note 153, at 523.
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A second potential step by Russian refonners toward a more North
American-like system adds the court to the picture: the law might per
mit the creditor to choose to bypass the debtor and petition the court di
rectly for authorization to pursue a desired alternate course of disposi
tion. Even this approach, though, has its faults. If the creditor in fact
finds a more lucrative means of realizing on the collateral, especially
when such disposition would result in no deficiency or even a surplus,
the vast majority of debtors would feel fortunate that they escaped vir

tually unscathed after default. 159 If all creditors who met with debtor in
transigence had to get a judicial declaration for such instances, many
cases that would otherwise eventually have been settled amicably with
out the involvement of the court will now needlessly clutter the judicial
docket. This will force the parties to incur unnecessary and deleterious
transaction costs, including not only direct court costs, but also lost op
portunity costs for wasteful diversion of time and other resources. The
concept of taking security exists in large part precisely to avoid costly
recourse to the court following default. Moreover, since the return from
the collateral will now be used to defray the additional court costs, a
deficiency may arise that might have been avoided without court in
volvement. Although permitting the court to place its imprimatur on al
ternate dispositions is certainly superior to blind, rigid, and ineffective
public auction requirements, the parties' rights might be protected more
efficiently if court involvement were limited to those instances where it

was actually necessary. 160

If Russian refonners agree that each of these previous steps im
proves the situation slightly but not enough, the final step toward bal
ancing debtor and creditor interests brings the lawmakers to something
closer to the North American approach. The law should allow the credi
tor to choose freely how to dispose of the collateral, but it should re
quire her to justify that disposition if the debtor feels dissatisfied. This
approach represents the best available alternative despite the monitoring
costs associated with judicial "reasonability" review of the creditor's

159. See, e.g., White, supra note 25, at 867 ("The nonnal business debtor is not
seeking a court ordered foreclosure with its attendant costs if a smaller deficiency upon
resale will be realized by a private sale or eliminated entirely by an acceptance of the
collateral as satisfaction for the indebtedness or obligation.").
160. If the creditor wishes to dispose of the collateral in a certain way, yet feels
unsure about the commercial reasonableness of that disposition, she should be allowed
to rely on a declarative judgment Article 9, for example, protects the creditor with a
conclusive .presumption of commercial reasonableness for dispositions that have been
"approved in any judicial proceeding or by any bona fide creditors' committee or repre
sentative of creditors." U.C.C. § 9-507(2) (1990). If the creditor chooses to seek refuge
in the court, the law should not discourage or deny such an exercise of prudent caution.
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choice.161 In most instances the rational debtor will be satisfied with the
greater return that the shrewd creditor managed to acquire by way of an
alternate, more lucrative realization mechanism. Additionally, by obvi
ating the need to resort immediately to either initial agreement or court
action, the parties will avoid needless transaction costs.
The law must maintain some check on creditor freedom, however,
and the court can most efficiently play its guiding role at the final stage
·
if, and only if, complications arise. If for some reason the debtor

-

feels that the creditor has disposed of the collateral in an unreasonable
way, resulting in an unjust deficiency obligation, she should be able to
seek the protection of the court. On the other hand, the creditor should
be able to rely on a modicum of certainty and predictability when malc
ing what seems at the time to be an acceptable disposition. The creditor
should ·not have to expend extra resources and heroic efforts finding the
single most lucrative method of disposing of the collateral.162 To this
end, the law should contain some general guidelines to protect the rea
sonable expectations of the creditor.163
Part S of Article 9, while perhaps not wholly transferable to a de
veloping legal system like that in Russia, should serve as a model for
the development of optimally effective guidelines for the realization of
collateral.164 The law should provide for the greatest possible flexibility
161. The monitoring costs in the United States have been significant. For just a
few of the myriad cases and ample commentary dealing with the issue of judicial deter
mination of commercial reasonableness, see the collection of materials on § 9-504 in 3B
U.L.A. 127, 136-40, 212-55 (1992). These problems may well be complicated further
by the overloaded and understaffed Russian court system. Nonetheless, American courts
have faced sitnilar problems, particularly in the large metropolitan areas where secured
transactions litigation is most prevalent, and it is a more acceptable solution for legisla
tors to attend to the pervasive problems in the court system than simply to capitulate to
such challenges by restraining productive marlcet flexibility.
162. See, e.g., Gn..MORE, supra note 1 1 , § 44.5, at 1237 ("The secured party is
not required to be a seer or a prophet
He is required to act with due diligence, to
use his best efforts
")
163. For an example of the dangers of demanding too much from the creditor, see
Vetter v. Bank of Or., 591 P.2d 768 (Or. Ct App. 1979). Gilmore considered that the law
might have gone even furtl\er than the liberal allowances of Article 9, particularly in
protecting the creditor's choice of an alternate disposition mechanism. See GILMORE,
supra note 1 1 , § 44.6, at 1246. He expressed his confidence that if this section of Arti
cle 9 were redrafted, "it should be possible, with ingenuity, perseverance and luck, to
take a longer step in the same direction." Id.
1 64. It must be emphasized, however, that exact equivalence between Article 9 or
the PPSA and the Russian law likely would not represent the best choice for Russian
lawmakers, and this Note does not advocate such legal imperialism. This Note simply
suggests that legislators should bear in mind the celebrated success of Article 9 when
considering sitnilar laws for their countries. Alejandro Garro, for example, advocates re
forming the security interest laws of Latin American countries according to the model
of Article 9. See Garro, supra note 128, at 199; Alejandro M. Garro, The Reform and
·
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in the creditor's choice of a realization mechanism, be it by public or
private sale or otherwise. 1 65 If the creditor can arrange for a truly more
commercially reasonable disposition of the collateral, it seems counter
productive and illogical to refuse to permit the creditor to pursue such
an option. The creditor should, however, notify the debtor of the final
choice, permitting the debtor to protect her own best interests by fulfil
ling the secured obligation or purchasing the collateral herself. The
onus of finding a reasonable means of disposition and possibly having
to convince a court of its superiority, however, must remain with the
creditor. This quid pro quo approach strikes the delicate balance be
tween debtor and creditor interests and deserves serious consideration
by any legislator wrestling with the problem of controlling the disposi
tion of collateraI. 166
CONCLUSION

Functional and rational laws providing a stable environment for in
vestment will represent the first line of defense in adequately protecting

Harmonization of Personal Property Security Law in Latin America, 59 REV. JUR.
U.P.R 1 (1990). While Latin America certainly is not identically situated with Russia,
one can draw compelling analogies between the development of the Russian and Latin
American economies.
165. The two most common forms of disposition "otherwise" than by sale would
be leasing the collateral and allowing the creditor simply to retain the collateral in satis
faction of the debt First, especially when the collateral had been leased before default,
subsequent lease might produce the best return. See McLAREN & DE JONG, supra note
128, § 23.03[2][a][i][A]; Thomas L. Rasnic, Comment, Commercial Reasonableness
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 33 TENN. L. REV. 211, 217 (1966). Such situa
tions, however, will represent the exception rather than the norm. See Davenport, supra
note 91, at 283; Brian Siegel, The Commercially Reasonable Disposition of Collateral,
80 COM LJ. 67, 67 n.4 (1975).
Second, in some situations, the parties may both be better off without a resale. See
U.C.C. § 9-505 cmt. 1 (1990); see also Hogan, supra note 25, at 215-19. Particularly if
the collateral consists of commercial paper, accounts, and chattel paper (some of the
most important sources of credit for most struggling small businesses), sale will nor
mally produce less than collection and retention by the creditor.
166. This paradigm of liberal allowances to the creditor tempered by a judicial
check has received the valuable endorsement of Professor Ulrich Drobnig of the Max
Planck Institute for Foreign and Private International Law. See Report of the Secretary
General: study on security interests, in 8 UNCITRAL Y.B. 171, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/131/1977. Professor Drobnig suggests that the only criterion for deciding how
to conduct the disposition should be "the practical one, which of the two methods
achieves the better results." Id. at 198. For other UNCITRAL examinations of world
wide security interest problems, see Report of the Secretary-General: security interests,·
feasibility ofuniform rules to be used in the financing oftrade, in 10 UNCITRAL Y.B.
81, U.N. Doc. AICN.9116511919; Report of the Secretary-General: security interests, is
sues to be considered in the preparation of uniform rules, in 11 UNCITRAL Y.B. 89,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/186/1980.

October 1996]

Note - Russian Secured Transactions

295

Russia's interests in the tremendous competition for capital in the world
today. The practice of establishing security in property plays a central
role in the general scheme of investor comfort; therefore, the law of se
cured transactions should be particularly sensitive to the needs of inves
tors and borrowers alike. An effective realization mechanism lies at the
heart of this law, ensuring the consistency and predictability that are so
crucial to the parties concerned.
Russian legislators have produced a sophisticated framework with
enormous potential for facilitating secured transactions, but they have
simultaneously debilitated this impressive structure by inhibiting its cru
cial realization phase. Imposing a public auction limitation on the credi
tor's disposition of the collateral is a mistake founded on unstable pol
icy grounds. First, while the successful commercial markets of Europe
function adequately despite the same sort of restriction, each of the Eu
ropean states whose civil codes likely influenced Russia's reform effort
has included explicit statutory language, narrowly construed the statu
tory language, or countenanced independent evasive techniques that
mitigate the untoward effects of the public auction restriction. Second,
creditors normally do not negligently devalue the collateral, and the
public auction limitation actually worsens the debtor's predicament by
ensuring a low return on the collateral: Finally, U.S. commercial experi
ence has demonstrated the shortcomings of the institution of public
auction.

In view of these problems, Russian legislators should institute a
more flexible, responsive legal regime for scrutinizing the disposition of
collateral. Providing access to the most effective means available for
obtaining the maximum return from the collateral will shift the benefit
from the denizens of public auctions to more appropriate recipients debtors and creditors.
Formulating a workable standard by which to evaluate the disposi
tion of collateral will demand hard thinking, much more so than the
simple imposition of a clear and simple rule against all forms of dispo
sition other than public auction. But relatively successful models al
ready exist, and legislators owe it to their constituents to find the opti
mal solution to the problem of debtor-creditor relations after default. A
simple limitation dating from the last century should not be allowed to
persist simply based on its venerability. Public auction fails to perform
the function for which it was designed, and such time-worn, reactionary
rules should be replaced by more complex and sensitive standards that
reflect the modem times to which they must adapt.

